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Worldwide efforts to adjust legal and regulatory regimes to cope
with the phenomenon of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) are part of a
more general global struggle to keep pace with the enormous advances in
information technology.' This struggle affects not only legal structures
defining commercial practice,2 but also the fundamental regulatory
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1 Professor Boss observes:
With the advent of more sophisticated technology, our globe is in effect, if not in fact, rapidly
shrinking. Thus it is not surprising that international trade is increasingly conducted by the
electronic transmission of data in all stages of the transaction, from negotiation through con-
tract formation, performance (e.g., shipment), insurance, and payment.
Amelia H. Boss, The International Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange and Electronic
Communications Technologies, 46 Bus. LAW. 1787 (1991); see also Sen. Larry Pressler and Kevin V.
Schieffer, A Proposal for Universal Telecommunications Service, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 351, 352 (1988)
("Driven by computer technology and telecommunications capabilities, the creation and distribution
of information around the globe has opened new horizons in business, education, government, and a
host of other areas. Our 'global village' is indeed becoming smaller and smaller.").
2 Much attention has been focused, justifiably, on the numerous, fascinating legal and commer-
cial issues that attend EDI, eg., how this major move towards paperless transactions affects basic
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frameworks of the telecommunications networks, technologies and serv-
ices through which EDI operations are performed. Telecommunications
regulatory issues and EDI service offerings and options will likely have
an increasingly direct and profound interrelationship as technology and
services continue to evolve, creating an ever greater convergence of tele-
communications transmission and information services. The conse-
quences of such a convergence become particularly acute and complex in
the international context. It is therefore vital for policymakers who ad-
dress EDI, as well as EDI providers and users, to be sensitive to the
substantive impact on EDI of regulatory requirements and issues appli-
cable to transmission networks, at both domestic and global levels.
This article provides a general introduction to various telecommuni-
cations regulatory issues that should be included in the "calculus" of do-
mestic and international EDI transactions. Part II places EDI generally
within the broader context of telecommunications "value added" serv-
ices, introducing the operational relationship between EDI and telecom-
munications networks, and the manner in which EDI services may be
influenced by global telecommunications regulatory schemes. Particular
emphasis is placed upon the United States as a "case study," in order to
provide a familiar baseline from which to touch upon broader issues at-
tending the international provision of EDI and other value added
services.
Part III examines selected fundamental issues that demonstrate the
impact of evolving regulatory frameworks on EDI transactions. Part III
also identifies different, multiple "levels" at which telecommunications
regulatory policies have an impact on EDI, including local, national and
international regulations; multilateral initiatives; and bilateral
agreements.
In particular, regulatory policies raise issues of service provision in-
volving who may provide EDI services; the parties with whom service
providers may interconnect; the terms and conditions under which ser-
vice may be provided (e.g., pursuant to a license or tariff); and overall,
the degree and nature of regulatory oversight required. Such provision-
ing issues substantially influence the technical and operational configura-
tions of international EDI and data networks. Regulatory policies also
set terms for fair competition between EDI providers and entrenched
legal structures with regard to contract formation, the Uniform Commercial Code, authentication of
evidence, etc. See, e.g., 6 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 1990 (Special Issue: Electronic Banking); 6 CoM-
PUTER L. & PRAC. 1989 (Special Issue: Electronic Data Interchange). Less attention has been paid
to the specific connection between the characteristics of EDI and evolving telecommunications poli-
cies, or how different regimes can affect opportunities for international transactions.
EDI Regulatory Implications
13:71(1992)
basic services providers, including opportunities for interconnection with
basic networks and options for competitive pricing of services. In addi-
tion, regulatory classifications can substantially affect notions of legal re-
sponsibility for consequential damages attending the loss of or damage to
transmitted information. Finally, telecommunications regulatory institu-
tions have substantial influence over the establishment of technical stan-
dards that affect the configurations and operations of data networks.
We conclude that regulatory policies, and the intersection of differ-
ing regulatory regimes among countries, can profoundly affect EDI
offerings.
II. EDI IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONTEXT
A. Operational Relationships Between EDI and
Telecommunications Systems
Simply put, EDI is the method by which business data may be com-
municated electronically between computers.' Perhaps the significant
distinguishing characteristic of EDI is that the information being com-
municated is structured into standardized formats (e.g., purchase orders,
shipping notices or remittance advices),4 permitting "effective, compre-
hensible data exchanges irrespective of the particular hardware or
software implemented at either end of the transmission by the communi-
cating parties."' The use of EDI has many benefits: it is a faster and
more precise means of arranging and documenting business transactions
than conventional methods, and it saves costs by eliminating manual la-
bor and reducing errors.
6
In general, most EDI communications between businesses utilize ex-
isting telecommunications facilities.' Although direct point-to-point
3 The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange - A Report and Model Trading Partner
Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW 1645, 1649 (1990) [hereinafter Commercial Use]; see Comment, Electronic
Contracts: Are They Enforceable Under Article 2 of the U.CC.?, 4 SOFrWARE L.J. 247, 253 (1991)
[hereinafter Comment]; Benjamin Wright, EDI and the American Law: A Practical Guide xiii (1989).
Technically stated, EDI is the transmission, in a standard syntax, of unambiguous information be-
tween computers of independent organizations. Commercial Use, supra, at 1649 n.1 (citing Accred-
ited Standards Comm. X12, Information Manual 2 (1989).
4 An EDI format consists of machine-language encoded information which is transmitted from
an originating computer and received by another computer that retrieves and interprets the data.
Comment, supra note 3, at 248 n.5 (citations omitted). Facsimile and electronic mail transmission,
on the other hand, are free-form textual communications that can be read by humans. Id. (citation
omitted).
5 Commercial Use, supra note 3, at 1650.
6 See Wright, supra note 3, at xiii.
7 See Jeffrey B. Ritter, Private Trade Data Networks: A Commercial Tapestry in Progress, 1990
A.B.A. Business Law Section Paper, Aug. 7, 1990, at 10; see also Commercial Use, supra note 3, at
1650 n. 10 (noting that EDI communications between businesses generally occur over telephone lines
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transmission of EDI communications between trading partners does oc-
cur, the more prevalent practice (both domestically and internationally)
is communication through third-party networks or service providers.'
These providers are able to achieve economies of scale that make their
services an attractive alternative to internal capital investment by EDI
users in network facilities, even for those who have the economic capabil-
ity to make such an investment.9
EDI users usually enter into a service agreement with a provider.
Pursuant to the agreement, the provider essentially functions as an elec-
tronic mail processing system, and may either 1) maintain electronic
"mailboxes" for trading partners into which EDI communications may
be placed, or 2) interconnect with other providers in order to facilitate
communication between their respective customers.10 The providers
generally are able to offer these services more cheaply than users can, and
often offer a variety of other add-on services."
A typical EDI arrangement may be illustrated by the following ex-
or satellite networks); Wright, supra note 3, at xiii, 37 (EDI users frequently use intermediary net-
works of one or more service providers); Daniel M. Norris & Elaine Waples, Control of Electronic
Data Interchange Systems, J. SYS. MoMT. 21 (March 1989) ("Trading partners using EDI have their
own systems and communicate over phone lines either directly or through a third-party network.")
[hereinafter EDI Systems].
8 Ritter, supra note 7, at 9. There are currently three types of EDI networks, in use. The first
type, known as a "distributed" network, is one where communications transpire directly between
EDI users. Comment, supra note 3, at 254 (citation omitted). The second type, known as "single
hub," is usually centered on a large company that has achieved a sufficient level of EDI activity to
initiate and control the network operation (essentially matching the function of a third-party pro-
vider). Smaller vendor companies seeking to do business with the hub company will usually custom-
ize their EDI operation to accommodate the hub company's needs, and the hub company's network
will usually extend upstream to suppliers and downstream to customers. See id. at n.39 (citations
omitted); Ritter, supra note 7, at 12 n.13. The third type of EDI network is the "clearinghouse"
network, centered on a third-party communication service organization. Comment, supra note 3, at
254 (citations omitted). This organization usually serves as a distribution and processing center to a
number of subscriber firms who each pay a usage fee to the third-party network. See id.
9 See Ritter, supra note 7, at 12; Commercial Use, supra note 3, at 1707. Users of EDI services:
employ third party or value added EDI networks ('networks' or 'service providers') because
they make data communications easier. A network can reduce the complexities of coordinating
communication with multiple partners. It can serve as a bridge between partners with incom-
patible computer systems and the outside world. A network can store and forward data and
perform data validation, translation and compliance checking routines. Networks also furnish
technical and operational advice.
Wright, supra note 3, at 37; see also EDI Systems, supra note 7, at 22 ("For many companies, the
most practical approach to EDI implementation is the use of a third-party service bureau. This type
of network reconciles differences in transaction formats and communication protocols, in addition to
performing the receiving, sorting and transmitting functions for the various parties involved.").
10 Commercial Use, supra note 3, at 1707; see Wright, supra note 3, at xiii.
11 Commercial Use, supra note 3, at 1707; see infra note 22.
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ample: 2 Companies X and Y have a long-standing purchase and sale
relationship. Company X, recognizing the economic and administrative
advantages of EDI, announces to its vendors, including Y, that it wil
require the use of EDI in future transactions.13 Company X enlists a
third-party provider, P, to receive, transmit, and sort X's various EDI
transmissions. X then determines which paper-based documents
(purchase orders and the like) will be replaced by EDI formats; decides
which industry standards will be adopted (around which all transmis-
sions will be structured); and implements certain security procedures for
assuring authenticity and integrity of electronic communications.1 4 All
of this information is communicated to X's vendors, including Y, who
must then implement EDI in order to keep X's business.5
Company X, as buyer, initiates a sales transaction by electronically
transmitting a purchase order to Y, which sets forth (in the sequence
specified by the chosen standard) the elements of information typically
contained in any purchase order, e.g., company name, quantity, price
and required date of delivery. 6 This purchase order 7 is initially sent to
P, X's provider, who stores and subsequently transmits the order to Y.
Upon receipt, Y transmits a message in return (a "functional acknowl-
edgment"), which verifies that the data were complete and in the correct
format. Upon reviewing the terms of the purchase order, Y transmits
another message confirming acceptance of its terms, e.g., a purchase or-
der acknowledgment or shipping notice. Both of these messages are sent
to P, the provider designated by X,18 which stores and transmits Y's
messages to X at pre-arranged times, or permits X to access electroni-
cally the appropriate files and have them transferred to X's computer. 19
Following contract formation,2 ° additional commercial messages
may be communicated electronically between X and Y, such as change
orders, invoices, and remittance advices.2 1 In general, providers like P in
the above example enter into written agreements with X and Y, which
12 The following example is virtually identical to the one set forth in Commercial Use, supra note
3, at 1655-57.
13 Commercial Use, supra note 3, at 1655.
14 See id. at 1656.
15 See id.
16 Id.
17 The purchase order is included in an electronic "envelope" that may contain other messages
to Y relating to other transactions. Id. at 1656.
18 Y could also contract with its own provider who, in turn, would exchange transmission with
P, X's provider. Id. at 1656 n.33.
19 Id.
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agreements may also specify other services to be provided, in addition to
transmission, storage and receipt of EDI documents.22
B. EDI Within Global Telecommunications Regulatory Schemes
The types of services that comprise EDI in the global market do not
fall easily within consistent definitional categories. EDI may be viewed
generally as a set of information services because it involves the transmis-
sion, structuring, and manipulation of information. 23 As discussed more
thoroughly below, there is as yet no worldwide consensus on the defini-
tion of "information services," nor is there a consistent terminology.
Such services are variously referred to as "information services," "en-
hanced services" or "value added services." The lack of consistency and
indeed the increasing diversity of definitions of such services, are at the
very root of the issues discussed herein.
In the United States, the types of services that comprise EDI are
identified generally by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
as "enhanced services," 24 and by the U.S. District Court for the District
22 Id. at 1656-67, 1707; see also Blanche Petre, Network Providers, 7 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 8
(1990) ("The function of the network providers [of EDI systems] must be underlined; not only do
they provide the means of transmission of the information, but they usually add value to this trans-
mission.").
The typical provider offers its services on a subscription basis; basic communication services are
generally performed for a flat rate, with additional per item charges based upon the number of
documents, and the length. Ritter, supra note 7, at 15. Services other than the basic communica-
tions activities are performed for additional fees. Id. Such additional services include: conversion of
protocols and line speeds, enabling trading partners with different hardware features to communi-
cate; storage, transmission and retrieval in accordance with a trading partner's capability, permitting
schedule coordination; format translation, whereby messages received pursuant to one standard may
be re-organized in order to be transmitted in another standard; message tracing, delivery notification
and integration reports, supporting internal audit functions and requirements; additional record re-
tention, ie., off-site backup for communication activities; implementation training and consultation;
security enhancement, particularly with regard to maintenance of passwords, identifying codes and
other identity information; and database development, where providers construct databases using
the content of EDI messages passing through their systems. Id. at 15-16.
23 In the broadest sense, the term "information services" encompasses information provided by
conventional telecommunications networks, or by other means such as cable television or printed
materials. Frederick Matos, Information Services, in NTIA, TELECOM 2000: CHARTING THE
COURSE FOR A NEW CENTURY 409, 426 (Nat'l Telecommunications and Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't
of Commerce ed. 1988). Such services include access to a variety of databases and software pro-
grams; automated transaction services (such as EDI services) for banking, ordering products and
trading securities; interactive instructional courses; and electronic mail. See id. at 410-11; see also
John Mintz, Baby Bells, Publishers Clash Over Information Services, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1992, at
Al, A6 (listing types of information services that the Bell Operating Companies may unveil soon,
e.g., customized news, sports, stock, weather reports; school computer links with scientific databases
and textbook outlines; college registration, car registration, dealings with local government, by
phone or computer; commands to call home to change thermostat, turn on lights, heat stove).
24 "Enhanced" services are those
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of Columbia in its enforcement of the AT&T Modified Final Judgment
(the "MFJ") as "information services."'2  In other parts of the world,
EDI services are known as "value added" services.2 6 Although there are
varying definitions of these terms, the discussion below employs the term
"value added" as a generalized reference to the category of services that
encompasses EDI. Specifically, as demonstrated in the preceding exam-
ple, an EDI provider usually supplies business service(s) to its customers
by leasing transmission capacity from a telecommunications carrier, and
then adding its variety of EDI-related services ("value") to the underly-
ing transmission.
services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communications,
which employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol
or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional,
different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1991); see Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 (1980) (Final
Decision) [hereinafter Computer I1], recon., 84 F.C.C.2d.50 (1980), further recon., 88 F.C.C.2d 512
(1981), aff'd sub nom., C.C.I.A. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938
(1983), further recon., F.C.C. 84-190 (May 4, 1984).
25 See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text. The district court and the MFJ itself defined
information services as:
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retriev-
ing, utilizing or making available information which may be conveyed via telecommunications,
except that such service does not include any use of any such capability for the management,
control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunica-
tions service.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 179, 229 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Neither the district court nor the FCC has
ever determined the exact overlap between their respective definitions of the pertinent terms,
although the district court did find the two definitions to be "essentially equivalent." See Matos,
supra note 23, at 428 n.51; 552 F. Supp. at 178 n.198. There may be potentially important differ-
ences between the definitions. In its 1987 review of telecommunications trade issues filed with the
district court, for example, NTIA characterized information services broadly into three classes: 1)
those generally regarded as logical extensions of telephone service; 2) those that involve access to an
interaction with computer databases; and 3) those which resemble mass media offerings. Matos,
supra note 23, at 428 n.51. Here, however, our perspective is confined simply to addressing EDI
services as information services (however the term's boundaries are precisely defined) that presently
occur almost exclusively over existing telecommunications facilities, and to pointing out why and
how such services potentially could be subject to telecommunications regulation. Therefore, for the
sake of simplicity, we consider the definitions of "enhanced," "value-added" and "information"
services to be essentially equivalent. Normative questions addressing perceived overlaps between the
FCC "enhanced" services definition and the MFJ's or NTIA's "information" services definition, for
example, or arguments for a spectrum of information services beyond the realm of "enhanced" serv-
ices, see, eg., Robert R. Bruce et aL, FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO ELECTRONIC SERVICES 45
(1986), are beyond the scope of this article.
26 The "value-added" services designation may be thought of as encompassing the broadest cate-
gory of U.S. "enhanced" services, "in which the value-added components are either in the network
or in the terminal." NTIA, International Value Added Services - An Introduction at 2, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce (March 1990) [hereinafter IVANs]. "For delivery, value-added/enhanced services use
either public switched network circuits or use leased common carrier circuits, and then add 'value'
to these basic circuits, usually through computer processing technology." Id.
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The central question addressed in this article is how the telecommu-
nications regulatory treatment of such "value-added" services affects cer-
tain basic aspects of providing EDI, namely, who may provide EDI,
under what terms and conditions, and with what consequences in the
event of damage to the transmitted information.
1. An Example: The U.S. Telecommunications Regulatory Structure
To see how EDI can be affected by telecommunications regulatory
structures in the global context, it is helpful first to place EDI service
within the context of our own domestic regulatory scheme.
Some of the most difficult questions in the lengthy evolution of U.S.
telecommunications regulation have been basic and definitional. Because
the Communications Act of 1934 (the central federal communications
legislation) has provided little guidance on how to categorize new serv-
ices, the FCC has struggled to define, distinguish, and adapt given regu-
latory categories to new services or activities made possible in part by the
merger of computer and communications systems.27
This broad definitional concern underlies two extended proceedings
that have been among the most influential and complex in shaping U.S.
communication regulation to date: 1) the FCC "Computer Inquiries" (I,
II & III), and 2) the court-ordered divestiture of the local Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) from American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T).
Both of these actions have generated numerous rulings that have deci-
sively affected U.S. telecommunications regulation, and have defined the
key regulatory classifications which are applicable to EDI.
a. FCC Proceedings
Under the Communications Act of 1934,28 "interstate and foreign"
communications provided by "common carriers" are regulated by the
FCC.29 Historically, the FCC encouraged and maintained an unregu-
lated environment for the offering of value added services that it deemed
27 See Bruce, supra note 25, at 153. This article focuses on U.S. federal regulations and various
international levels of telecommunications regulation. We have not attempted a thorough examina-
tion of regulatory regimes at individual state levels. Nevertheless, the states do exhibit significant
variety in implementing critical telecommunications policies. For a very good discussion of the
interrelationship between state and federal policies that affect enhanced services providers in the
United States, see Walt Sapronov and William D. Friend, Regulation of Enhanced Services: The
State Wild Card, COMPUTER LAW. (Jan. 1992).
28 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
29 Id. at § 152(a). This general grant of power is divided into three regulatory regimes covering
common carriers, broadcasters, and (as of November, 1984) cable television operators. See id. at
subchs. II, III, V-A (1988); Bruce, supra note 25, at 156. Intrastate communications are regulated
by state utilities and public service commissions. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
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to be non-common carrier offerings.3 °
As technology progressed, however, regulated communications car-
riers began to incorporate computers and data processing capabilities
into their transmission networks, engendering new, sophisticated com-
munications services. The "growing convergence of computers and com-
munications"31 forced the FCC to balance its traditional responsibility to
regulate communications networks with a conflicting policy of regulatory
forbearance intended to promote the competitive development of new in-
formation service offerings. The result of the FCC's sixteen-year grapple
with this dilemma was a well-known pair of decisions commonly referred
to as the "Computer Inquiries," or Computer 132 and Computer 11.33
In Computer I, the FCC established a definitional boundary between
regulated common carrier communications services on the one hand, and
unregulated data processing services on the other. The FCC's ruling al-
lowed non-AT&T34 common carriers to provide data processing services
30 Matos, supra note 23, at 427. Subchapter II of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-
224, details the FCC's authority to regulate common carriers. When the statute was passed in 1934,
.,common carriers" were the monopoly telephone and telegraph operators, and regulating them
meant restricting the abuse of market power. Bruce, supra note 25, at 156. This job required rate
restrictions in order to check excessive profits, and assure that all users would be served. Id.; see also
id. at 157 (FCC's authority to regulate common carriers was designed to ensure that the FCC could
maintain effective regulatory control over AT&T, which in 1934 meant regulating the company's
operation as a monopoly); Richard S. Wyde, Telecommunications Law and Electronic Fund Transfer
Services, 44 Bus. LAW. 1101, 1104 (1989) (AT&T and monopoly operators were stringently regu-
lated in order to ensure that the carriers were neither overcharging customers nor earning more than
their regulated rates of return).
Note that determining precisely who is a "common carrier" has engendered much scholarly
debate and frequent litigation, particularly between the FCC and the states (since FCC jurisdictional
authority is limited only with respect to intrastate "common carriers," and not to other types of
"non-carrier" service providers). Bruce, supra note 25, at 157-58. The Communications Act de-
fines the term circularly as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)
(1988). The courts generally have imported common law concepts of common carriage from trans-
portation to define a common carrier as one who holds itself out to the public for hire to transmit
communications of the user's choosing, see National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC,
525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1977), although the definition has
become increasingly complicated (and inapplicable) with respect to certain services, e.g., mobile ra-
dio services. See Bruce, supra note 25, at 158 (and sources cited).
31 Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Commu-
nications Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) (Notice of Inquiry) [hereinafter Computer I,
Notice of Inquiry].
32 Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Commu-
nications Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (Final Decision) [hereinafter Computer 1],
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
33 Computer II, supra note 24. See generally Bruce, supra note 25, at 197-207; Robert M.
Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the Communications/Information Processing Terrain, 33
FED. CoMNM. L.J. 55 (1981) [hereinafter Frieden, Computer Inquiries].
34 AT&T historically had monopolized telecommunications services and equipment. Because of
allegedly illegal activities under its authorized monopoly, AT&T faced several antitrust suits. One of
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on an unregulated basis, 35 if such services were provided by a structurally
separate subsidiary.36  "Hybrid" services, combining both telecommuni-
cations and data processing functions, 37 were to be regulated according
to a case-by-case approach, depending on which function
predominated.38
The FCC ultiimnately determined that its Computer I case-by-case ap-
proach was unwieldy and stifling to the development and widespread use
of new information services. 39 It therefore abandoned its communica-
the most significant of these was filed in 1949, where the government alleged that AT&T had, with
Western Electric, "monopolized and conspired to restrain trade in the manufacture, distribution,
sale, and installation of telephones, telephone apparatus, equipment, materials, and supplies."
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982). As a result, in
1956, a consent decree was entered that restrained AT&T from offering services other than common
carrier communications services, such as data processing services (although it could develop such
services and equipment for internal use). See infira note 54 and accompanying text; see also Wyde,
supra note 30, at 1109; Bruce, supra note 25, at 199.
35 Wyde, supra note 30, at 1105-06 (footnotes omitted). The FCC's concern here was with:
the increased availability and use of computer systems that could provide both data processing
and message switching functions. By combining these systems with communications channels
linking remote locations, large corporations with excess capacity on their in-house computers
could offer the general public, on a time-sharing basis, a panoply of data processing and data
base services. At the same time, common carriers were making increasing use of such com-
puters to perform message and circuit switching functions in their communications networks.
It was apparent that they, too, would inevitably broaden their service offerings into the data
processing field.
Bruce, supra note 25, at 198; see Computer I Notice of Inquiry, supra note 31, at 12-14.
36 Computer I, supra note 32, at 270-71; Wyde, supra note 30, at 1106. The FCC was concerned
that the provision of unregulated data processing services by common carriers might give rise to
certain problems, ., that common carriers might favor their own data processing activities through
cross-subsidization, improper pricing of common carrier services, and related anti-competitive prac-
tices, which could result in burdening or impairing the carrier's provision of other, regulated serv-
ices. Computer II, supra note 24, at 391. This was the rationale behind the FCC's requirement of
"maximum separation" - that communications common carriers had to furnish data processing
services through a separate corporate entity. Id. (footnote omitted).
37 Technically, the FCC defined "hybrid service" as "[a]n offering of service which combines
remote access data processing with message-switching to form a single integrated service." Com-
puter I, supra note 32, at 277 n. I1 (citing Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interde-
pendence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 296 (1970)
(Tentative Decision)).
38 Wyde, supra note 30, at 1106 (citing Computer I, supra note 32 at 276). Hence, the thrust of
the FCC's definitional approach in Computer I was 1) to establish a dichotomy between data
processing and message or circuit switching, and then 2) to examine with respect to individual "hy-
brid" services whether the service offered message-switching "incidental" to a primarily data
processing service (causing total regulatory forbearance), or a data processing function "incidental"
to a package which was oriented to satisfy communications or message-switching requirements
(causing the entire integrated service to be regulated as a communications service). See Computer II,
supra note 24, at 390.
39 See Matos, supra note 23, at 427. Computer I contemplated a technological environment in
which subscribers' remote, "unintelligent" terminals were linked to a central computer that provided
data processing services. Bruce, supra note 25, at 202. Subsequently, however, rapid advances in




Instead, in Computer II, the FCC decided to apply its common car-
rier regulatory scheme only to those carriers that offered what it termed
"basic" telecommunications services. A "basic" service is a carrier offer-
ing of "pure transmission capability over a communications path that is
virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer-supplied
information".40 In other words, the service essentially offers nothing
more than information transport.41 Common carrier offerings of such
basic services remain subject to the Communications Act tariff filing and
other regulatory requirements.42
computers, micro-computers, and other devices capable of duplicating the data processing functions
previously performed by the central computer. Id. Thus, it became possible, and cost-beneficial, for
users to distribute some of the processing power either to terminals located on the customer's prem-
ises or to facilities incorporated within the communications network itself. Id.; see Computer II,
supra note 24, at 391.
The Computer I communications/data processing distinction failed to address services that uti-
lized the aforementioned distributed processing technologies. Bruce, supra note 25, at 202. The
FCC was therefore forced to cope with a variety of unanticipated forms of hybrid service, and it
became increasingly difficult to determine which service was incidental to which; "these services'
growing ubiquity made ad hoc determinations an administrative quagmire." Id.; see Second Com-
puter Inquiry, 72 F.C.C.2d 358, 362, 365 (1978) (Tentative Decision); Computer I, supra note 24, at
391-93. Moreover, terminals and other types of customer premises equipment (CPE) offered by both
the regulated carrier sector and the unregulated data processing sector were increasingly capable of
performing both communications and information processing functions; this also raised problems of
how such offerings should be classified for regulatory purposes. Bruce, supra note 25, at 202-03; see
72 F.C.C.2d at 406-12; Computer II, supra note 24, at 435-36.
40 Computer II, supra note 24, at 420.
41 A basic service is the offering of a "'transmission pipeline' in contrast to the myriad services
that are dependent upon, but different in kind from the pipeline service." Second Computer Inquiry,
84 F.C.C.2d 50, 54 (1980) (Reconsideration Order).
42 Matos, supra note 23, at 428. Note that in its Competitive Carrier decisions, the FCC reduced
the regulatory burdens on competitive carriers without market power - so-called "non-dominant"
carriers - by applying streamlined regulation or forbearance. See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking,
77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979) (Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking), 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980) (First
Report and Order), 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981) (Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 91 F.C.C.2d
59 (1982) (Second Report and Order), recon., 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308 (1982)
(Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 48 Fed. Reg. 28,292 (1983) (Third Further No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking), 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983) (Third Report and Order), 95 F.C.C.2d
544 (1983) (Fourth Report and Order), 96 F.C.C.2d 922 (1984) (Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking), 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984) (Fifth Report and Order), 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985) (Sixth
Report and Order), vacated and remanded sub nom., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Mark S. Fowler, et al., "Back to the Future'" A Model for Telecommunications, 38
FED. COMM. L.J. 145, 157 & n.37 (1986); see also Sutapa Gnosh, The Future of FCC Dominant
Carrier Rate Regulation: The Price Cap Scheme, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 401 (1989).
The Competitive Carrier dominant/non-dominant regime is also applied, with some modifica-
tions, to international services. International Competitive Carrier Policies, 102 F.C.C.2d 812 (1985),
recon. den., 60 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 2d 1435 (1986). The FCC divided the international market into two
categories: IMTS (international message telephone services) and non-IMTS (including telex, tele-
gram, TWX, private line, high and low speed data, videoconferencing and International Business
Services offered by Comsat). Most international carriers, except AT&T, are non-dominant for
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The FCC recognized a second category of services in Computer II.
This category it labeled "enhanced" services, which involve the perform-
ance of various computer processing applications on transmitted infor-
mation or subscriber interaction with stored information.43 According to
the FCC's definitional scheme, "enhanced" services are not "common
carrier" services and are left unregulated under Title II of the Communi-
cations Act (although the FCC has argued that they remain within its
"ancillary" jurisdiction under Title I of the Act.)"
In creating the "enhanced" services category, the FCC required
only AT&T and GTE to establish a separate subsidiary to provide com-
petitive, unregulated (enhanced) services, and to sell customer terminal
equipment.45 The FCC imposed this maximum separation requirement
in order to prevent cost shifting between competitive and monopoly-
based activities, and thus to eliminate opportunities for unlawful cross-
subsidization of the unregulated services via revenues from regulated
activities.46
IMTS, with other carriers providing international services to non-contiguous international points,
e.g., Hawaiian Telephone for Hawaii and Alascom for Alaska, and Comsat for the provision to the
Intelsat space segment. All carriers are non-dominant for the provision of non-IMTS.
There are two essential differences between domestic and international Computer 11 policies.
First, non-dominant international carriers are not subject to forbearance, but rather only to stream-
lined regulation, and thus must still keep tariffs on file with the FCC. Second, a "foreign-owned
carrier" (defined as any "U.S. carrier over 15% directly or indirectly owned by a foreign telecommu-
nications entity or on whose board of directors an employee, agent or representative of a telecommu-
nications entity sits," 102 F.C.C.2d at 842 n.74), is treated as dominant. Foreign owned carriers are
also subject to special reporting requirements imposed by the FCC as a consequence of reciprocity
concerns. Regulatory Policies and International Telecommunications, FCC 88-71, released March
25, 1988; recon. 4 FCC Red 323 (1989);further recon. 7 FCC Red 1715 (1992). The FCC is cur-
rently considering a modification to this latter rule which would eliminate the 15% threshold mea-
sure and apply dominant carrier regulation to companies affiliated with (Le., controlling, controlled
by, or under common ownership or control with) a foreign telecommunications entity. Dominant
regulation would apply only on those routes where the foreign affiliate has the ability to discriminate
against non-affiliated U.S. international carriers through control of bottleneck facilities and services.
International Common Carrier Services, 7 FCC Red 577 (1992) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
43 See supra note 24.
44 See Matos, supra note 23, at 428; see Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. F.C.C.,
693 F.2d 198, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
45 Computer II, supra note 24, at 389; Wyde, supra note 30, at 1107-08; see Matos, supra note 23,
at 428. GTE was subsequently exempted from structural separation upon reconsideration. See 84
F.C.C.2d at 72-73.
46 Wyde, supra note 30, at 1108. Such cross-subsidies could lead to understatement of costs for
the dominant carrier's competitive activities. Structural separation also prevented the dominant car-
rier from utilizing customer proprietary network information (CPNI) to gain an unfair competitive
advantage. When the BOCS were later divested from AT&T (see below), the FCC ruled that its
Computer II separate subsidiary requirements would also apply to the divested Bell companies.
Matos, supra note 23, at 428 (citing Bell Operating Cos., 95 F.C.C.2d 1117 (1983) (Separation Or-




To date, the FCC's Computer II "basic/enhanced" distinction re-
mains intact in the United States.47 However, in its "Third Computer
Inquiry" proceeding (Computer 11),"8 the FCC revisited the structural
separation requirements for the enhanced service operations of AT&T
and the BOCs. The FCC confronted arguments that its structural sepa-
ration rules were not cost-effective, and in certain instances, prohibited
the BOCs from introducing innovative service offerings to the public.49
In response, the FCC replaced the separate subsidiary requirement gov-
erning AT&T's and the BOCs' participation in "enhanced service" mar-
kets with "nonstructural" safeguards.50
These safeguards included, among other things, additional cost allo-
cation controls, and network access requirements for competitors in the
form of "Comparably Efficient Interconnection" (CEI)51 and "Open
Network Architecture" (ONA),52 and protections against abuse of cus-
47 The FCC first confronted the issue of the applicability of its Computer I policies to interna-
tional services when GTE-Telenet Communications Corp. and Tymnet, Inc. proposed the provision
of international packet switched data networks on a common carrier basis. The Commission con-
firmed that such international services are classified as non-common carrier enhanced services and
must therefore be offered on a non-tariffed basis. GTE Telenet Communications Corp., File No. I-
T-C-81-274, FCC 85-29, Mimeo No. 35448 (released Feb. 22, 1985). Note that the uncertainties
that such enhanced services providers might face in arranging interconnections with foreign PTTs
without some official U.S. authorization prompted the FCC to examine entitlement of enhanced
services providers to status as international "recognized private operating agencies" (RPOAs). See
infra notes 119-132 and accompanying text.
48 Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Final Decision) [hereinafter Computer
III], rev'd sub. nom., California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
49 Matos, supra note 23, at 428. See Computer III, supra note 48, at 987-93.
50 See Computer II, supra note 48, at 964-66; Matos, supra note 23, at 428; Robert M. Frieden,
The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED COMM. L.J. 383, 386 (1987).
On June 6, 1990, the Ninth Circuit reversed Computer 111, holding that the FCC 1) did not
adequately articulate its reasons for substituting nonstrnctural safeguards for the federal structural
separation requirements to which the BOCs were previously subject; and 2) failed to carry its burden
of showing why it needed to preempt state regulation of intrastate enhanced services. See California
v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990); Robert M. Frieden, Open Telecommunications Policies
for Europe" Promises and Pitfalls, 31 JURIMETRIUS J. 319, 320 n.4 (1991) [hereinafter Frieden, Eu-
rope]; see also infra note 52.
51 The purpose of CEI is to assure that equal network access is guaranteed to all parties in the
event that regulated carriers like AT&T or the BOCs offer a specific information service. Matos,
supra note 23, at 428. See generally Computer III, supra note 48, at 1021-59 (discussing CEI). The
CEI requirements contemplated the filing of CEI plans which would be reviewed and approved by
the FCC prior to the carrier offering the enhanced service. Id. at 1054-55.
52 "ONA is a more long range and non-service specific plan to foster the growth of the enhanced
or information services industry." Matos, supra note 23, at 428-29; see Computer I, supra note 48,
at 1059-1068. ONA requires the BOCs to unbundle their basic network service offerings and make
the underlying basic service elements available to their information service competitors on a tariffed
basis. Matos, supra note 23, at 429.
The FCC established ONA in an attempt to reduce regulation while ensuring that providers of
domestic or international "enhanced services," like Value Added Networks (VANs), achieve equal
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b. Antitrust Litigation: AT&T, Divestiture & the Modified Final
Judgment (MFJ)
In 1949, AT&T and Western Electric were subject to an antitrust
suit that resulted in the entry of a 1956 consent decree which prohibited
AT&T from engaging "in any business other than the furnishing of com-
mon carrier communications services."54 In 1974, the Justice Depart-
ment filed a separate suit against AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell
Telephone Laboratories, alleging that these companies had illegally
sought to monopolize various telecommunications service and equipment
markets.5 Judge Harold H. Greene approved settlement of this suit in
1982. The settlement, commonly referred to as the Modified Final Judg-
ment (MFJ),56 concluded more than thirty years of litigation between
AT&T and the government. The decree continues to affect the restruc-
turing of the telecommunications marketplace, and its provisions contain
many rules by which the market's "key players" (AT&T and the now
independent BOCs) must abide.5 7
and cost-based access to essential local exchange facilities of thi BOCs. Frieden, Europe, supra note
50, at 320. ONA:
purports to achieve a 'level competitive playing field' between all enhanced service providers,
including affiliates of the Bell Operating Companies, who can select access functions reduced to
the least common denominator. In effect, enhanced service providers select network facilities
and features on an i la carte basis so that they can tailor service by blending what is needed
from the Bell Operating Company with their own information processing functions.
Id.
Following the reversal of Computer III, the FCC moved quickly to reinstate its ONA require-
ment. See Third Computer Inquiry, 5 F.C.C.Rcd. 7719 (1990) (Remand Proceedings) (requiring the
BOCs to proceed with implementation of ONA plans irrespective of the agency's ultimate decision
on the future of structural separation). In addition, the FCC granted the BOCs waivers of the
applicable Computer II structural separation requirements, pending another comprehensive assess-
ment of its policies. See Bell Operating Companies' Joint Petition for Waiver of Computer II Rules,
5 F.C.C.Rcd. 4714, waiver extended and clarified, 6 F.C.C.RCd. 174 (1990); Frieden, Europe, supra
note 50, at 320 n.4.
53 See Computer 111, supra note 48, at 1086-92.
54 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCII) 68,246, at 71,138 (D.N.J. 1956).
55 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698, (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1974). The gov-
ernment indicated that it brought its 1974 suit because in its judgment the 1956 consent decree, see
1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68, 246, was not adequate to prevent activities that unreasonably re-
strained competition in telecommunications equipment markets, and did not protect against anti-
trust violations in the intercity telecommunications field. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, 139 n.18 (D.D.C. 1982).
56 Jurisdiction over the older 1949 antitrust action and 1956 consent decree ultimately was trans-
ferred from the U.S. District Court of New Jersey to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia. The 1949 and 1974 suits were then consolidated. The proposed settlement was to be
treated as a modification of the final judgment in the original 1949 suit; when approved, it would
dissolve the 1956 consent decree. Hence, the settlement is referred to as the "MFJ."
57 See Bruce, supra note 25, at 177.
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The MFJ's central requirement was that AT&T divest itself from
the twenty-two wholly-owned BOCs. The latter were subsequently com-
bined into seven regional holding companies (RHCs). Judge Greene ap-
proved the divestiture because a substantial amount of evidence had
suggested that AT&T's anticompetitive behavior was based upon its con-
trol over local telephone exchange facilities and equipment. 8 He con-
cluded that "[a]bsent such control, AT&T will not have the ability to
disadvantage competitors in the interexchange and equipment
markets."59
One aspect of the MFJ particularly relevant to the provision of EDI
services involves the so-called "line of business" restrictions imposed
upon AT&T and, to a greater extent, the RHCs. Essentially, the MFJ
prevented both AT&T and the RHCs from entering into certain markets
where manipulation of their monopoly power would enable the compa-
nies to engage in anti-competitive behavior ° For AT&T, this concern
applied to only one area61 - electronic publishing services, defined as
those services in which AT&T "would control, or have a financial inter-
est, in the content of the information being transmitted."'6
In contrast to AT&T's relative freedom to explore new markets,
however, the RHCs were subjected to a number of "line of business re-
strictions."63 In general, these rules prevented the RHCs from engaging
in any other service that might unfairly benefit from the RHCs' monop-
oly control over access." Three "core" restrictions were imposed upon
the RHCs. Under these restrictions, the RHICs were not permitted to 1)
provide interexchange services of any kind;65 2) provide "information
services";" or 3) manufacture telecommunications equipment and cus-
58 See 552 F. Supp. at 160-63.
59 Id. at 165.
60 See Wyde, supra note 30, at 1109.
61 AT&T had been limited by the 1956 consent decree to providing only common carrier com-
munications services; the 1982 decree proposed dissolving this restriction and allowing AT&T to
compete in all lines of business. Because Judge Greene concluded that AT&T, after divesting from
the BOCs, would not have the power to exert an anticompetitive influence on other unregulated
businesses, he approved the removal of all business restrictions on the company save the one on
electronic publishing services. See 552 F. Supp. at 179-181.
62 552 F. Supp. at 180.
63 See 552 F. Supp. at 186-195 (addressing "Restrictions on the Divested Operating
Companies").
64 Thus, the MFJ's central restriction on the RHCs prohibits them from providing "any product
or service that is not a natural monopoly service actually regulated by tariff." 552 F. Supp. at 186;
see Bruce, supra note 25, at 180.
65 552 F. Supp. at 188-89.
66 Id. at 189-90. As indicated, the "information services" definition is quite similar to the FCC's
definition of "enhanced services," and the possible differences in overlap are not relevant to this
article. See supra note 25.
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In his 1987 "triennial review" of the continuing need for the restric-
tions imposed by the MFJ, Judge Greene saw no basis for removing the
decree's three core restrictions.68 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed
the decision on various issues, but reversed and remanded with regard to
the restriction on "information services.",6 9 In accordance with the ap-
pellate court's mandate, Judge Greene reluctantly7" ordered that the "in-
formation services" restriction on the RHCs be removed.71
67 552 F.Supp. 190-91. In general, these restrictions were "based upon the kinds of anticompeti-
tive activities that the local companies had engaged in while they were still a part of the Bell System,
or were likely to engage in because of the ability and the incentive therefor were present." United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 310 (D.D.C. 1991).
68 767 F. Supp. at 310. See generally United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525
(D.D.C. 1987) (the "triennial review"). Judge Greene's rationale for keeping the core restrictions
intact focused on the RHCs' retention of their monopoly control of the local telephone switches and
wires; this fact meant that competitors of these companies in the markets affected by the restrictions
could reach their ultimate customers only at the RHCs' sufferance. 767 F. Supp. at 311. The RHCs
would be in the same position as their predecessor in the Bell System, and could discriminate against
competitors by practices such as "delaying interconnections, providing inferior connections, charg-
ing exorbitant prices, or refusing to attach competitors' products altogether"; they could also subsi-
dize their competitive products with funds "syphoned off from the monies paid by ratepayers." Id.
(citing 673 F. Supp. at 600).
Although continuing the restriction on information services, Judge Greene did subsequently
modify his position a bit. The court ruled that the RHCs could offer electronic white (but not
yellow) pages, as well as "information transmission," or transmission gateways, by which others can
provide information services to the public. See 673 F. Supp. at 596, 603. In another round of line of
business waivers, the court ruled that the RHCs could offer electronic mail and voice messaging
services, in order to promote the development of a mass market in these areas. Matos, supra note 23,
at 432. Other than expanding the RHCs' services as information "conduits," however, the court
continued to restrict any generation or manipulation of content. Id.
69 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., MCI
Comm. Corp. v. United States, Ill S.Ct. 283 (1990). The D.C. Circuit held that the MFJ court had
applied the wrong section of the consent decree, and consequently the incorrect standard of review.
See id. at 309. Because the appellate court could not be sure that the trial court's findings were not
"infected" by its legal error regarding the proper standard of review, the appellate court remanded
the decision for further consideration of whether removal of the information-services restriction as
applied to generation of information could be competitive under present market conditions. Id.
70 In the opinion on remand, Judge Greene stated that if the court were free to exercise its own
judgment, "it would conclude without hesitation that removal of the information services restriction
is incompatible with the decree and the public interest." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F.
Supp. 308, 327 (D.D.C. 1991). The court concluded, however, that several rulings in the D.C.
Circuit's opinion left "it no choice but to remove the restriction," which it did with "considerable
reluctance." Id.
71 Judge Greene also, however, stayed the effect of his decision pending the completion of appel-
late review, and subsequently denied reconsideration of that ruling. United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 774 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1991). One commentator opined that Judge Greene did not really lift
the restriction on information services at all, but instead wrote the story with two endings and "in-
vited the Court of Appeals to pick." Peter Kenney, Jr., A Busy Signal from the Judge, LEGAL TIMES
(Aug. 5, 1991) at 28, 31. On October 7, 1991, the D.C. Circuit vacated Judge Greene's stay, and its




As mentioned, EDI providers - who customarily offer storage,
data base access, validation, authentication, security, and other informa-
tion services - fall within the U.S. regulatory classification of "en-
hanced" services providers. As such, they generally are not subject to
regulation by the FCC as common carriers under Title II of the Commu-
nications Act.72 Consequently, the importance of telecommunications
regulatory issues to EDI providers relative to other commercial or legal
issues is easily overlooked. However, as developed further below, espe-
cially in the international context, the present telecommunications regu-
latory classification of EDI is not the end of the story, but rather is only
the beginning.
In the context of domestic U.S. policy, significant changes to the
market landscape for EDI and similar services will occur through the
inevitable, continued evolution of regulatory classifications and other
legal constraints. The development of the "basic"/"enhanced" distinc-
tion in Computer 11 represented the best effort of the FCC at the time to
address the failure of the Computer I "communications"/"data process-
ing" dichotomy to establish a reasonable bright line between services that
should be regulated and those that should not. Nevertheless, the subse-
quent Computer III proceeding expressed frustration with the "relative
inflexibility" of the Computer II regulatory framework,7 3 and included a
[lifting the information services ban] will be reversed." See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,610, at 66,711 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Bell Companies May Offer Information
Services Immediately; Appeals Court Decision Spurs Legislative Efforts, COMPUTER LAW., Nov.
1991, at 39 [hereinafter Bell Companies].
Parallel to the activity in the federal courts, controversy surrounding the development of new
information services continues to mount in the legislature, where the RHCs have quite recently
squared off against the publishing industry in a burgeoning congressional battle over information
services. See Mintz, supra note 23, at Al, A6; Bell Companies, supra, at 39. Also, battle lines on the
reintroduction of limitations on DOC provision of information services are now being drawn in the
context of legislative initiatives to replace the MFJ with statutory directives. For example, the pend-
ing "Telecommunications Act of 1991" would establish a series of detailed restrictions on BOC entry
into the information services market, effectively overruling substantial portions of judicial decisions
permitting such entry. See H.R. 3515, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also The "Information
Services Diversity Act of 1991," S. 2112, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. 1991) (companion bill to H.R. 3515).
Similarly, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Brooks (D-Tex) has recently introduced his ver-
sion of the "Antitrust Reform Act of 1992," H.R. 5096, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), which would
roll back gains that the RHCs have made in courts, notably the lifting of the information services
barrier, as well as create new rules for the RHCs' participation in long distance service and telecom-
munications equipment manufacturing. See Claudia MacLachlan, Baby Bell Battle in Congress,
NAT'L L.J., May 25, 1992, at 1, 16; Brooks Offers Comprehensive MFJ Legislation, COMM. DAILY,
May 7, 1992, at 8.
72 See supra note 30.
73 See Computer III, supra note 48, at 1018.
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comprehensive review of the basic/enhanced distinction, along with the
consideration of a vastly different set of regulatory classifications.74
Although the basic/enhanced definitional approach was reaffirmed, con-
tinued analysis of how the division applies to new technologies and serv-
ices evidences a growing fuzziness to the line."
More dramatically, the applicability of the U.S. common carrier/
non-common carrier and basic/enhanced distinctions is becoming in-
creasingly attenuated in the global context. The U.S. system of regula-
tory classifications is extremely complex, and reflects the manifest
awkwardness of adapting a statutory scheme conceived in 1934 to the
unforeseen space-age technologies and global market interplays of today.
As other countries adopt more simplified schemes, and as multinational
user needs for convenient communications across time zones and date
lines press for more intelligence in "basic" networks, more fundamental
74 Soon after the Computer II structural separation rules were applied to the BOCs, the FCC
published its Third Computer Inquiry, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581 (1985) (Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing), in which it proposed to dismantle or modify its existing regulatory framework, including the
basic/enhanced distinction. The FCC "sought to tailor more directly the extent of [its] regulation to
the degree of competition in particular markets, in order to permit the public to realize the full
benefits of competition where competition can function." Computer III, supra note 48, at 963 (foot-
note omitted).
The FCC proposed several possible frameworks. One framework involved a three-part distinc-
tion between basic communications services, which would be regulated directly; non-communica-
tions services, which would be completely unregulated; and services "ancillary to communications."
See 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,589-90; Steven M. Spaeth, Comment, A Comparative Study of the Regulatory
Treatment of Enhanced Services in the United States and the European Community, 9 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 415, 425-26 (1988) [hereinafter Spaeth, Comparative]. In the "ancillary" category, the
FCC would examine the structure of the market for that service, and would regulate the service if it
could be provided with unlimited economies of scale and/or scope such that there would be no
multiple vendors of the service; on the other hand, if the carrier wanted to offer the service with
limited economies of scale and scope, regulation would turn on whether the carrier was "dominant,"
or had control of "bottleneck" facilities. Computer III Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,589; Spaeth, Com-
parative, supra, at 426 (footnotes omitted). If so, some sort of separation would be appropriate to
prevent anticompetitive conduct.
The FCC ultimately "declined to adopt the proposal... for a regulatory framework based upon
the market for specific services," opting instead to maintain the basic/enhanced distinction, abolish
structural separation, and impose CEI and ONA requirements. Computer III, supra note 48, at 964.
75 In the Computer III Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC cited protocol processing as an
example that highlighted the "ambiguous" definition of "enhanced service":
The first principal clause of the definition addresses 'computer processing applications that act
on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted infor-
mation.' Many experts on standardization of protocols, however, would probably include ac-
tion on the 'format' and 'code' within processing of the 'protocol.' A change in the speed of a
subscriber's transmission might well be viewed as a change in protocol, yet because we ruled in
Computer II that intermediate network storage not under the control of the subscriber does not
invoke the definition of 'enhanced service[,]' we have treated a speed change as an element of
basic service.
50 Fed. Reg. at 33,583."
EDI Regulatory Implications
13:71(1992)
changes to the U.S. regulatory structure undoubtedly will continue to
occur.
Thus, at some point in the future, the line between regulated and
unregulated services most likely will again be redrawn in the United
States. How such a change will affect EDI providers is impossible to
predict. At a minimum, the reworking of regulatory distinctions will af-
fect the nature of the market; specifically, it will affect the types of enti-
ties that can provide EDI and similar services, as well as the terms and
conditions under which such services can be provided.
Even without dramatic changes in regulatory classifications, the
market for unregulated provision of EDI and similar services in the
United States rests upon shifting sands. One palpable example of this is
embodied in the changes to rules governing the participation of the
RHCs in information services markets. Until very recently, the MFJ im-
posed "line of business" restrictions that prevented the RHCs from en-
tering the market for the types of information service offerings that
include EDI services. Now that such restrictions have been removed, it
may be that the RHCs will vigorously enter the market for information
services, and alter the competitive environment for EDI providers in a
significant manner.76
In the international arena, circumstances are even more dynamic.
As telecommunications markets become more diverse, and as user re-
quirements press for liberalization of state-run monopoly regimes, many
foreign countries struggle to craft workable distinctions between regu-
lated basic monopoly services and less-regulated competitive market
services. Such variety across world regulatory schemes introduces subtle
complications to the establishment of international value added net-
works. Adding to the complexities of domestic regimes are international
rules and recommendations on service restrictions, as well as regulatory
76 As one commentator has noted, "information services" (of which EDI is a part) will be
viewed:
as a leading area of economic growth for many years to come. The vital infrastructure which
connects the elements of modern information networks is, for many purposes, still a telephone
company monopoly. Moreover, the lines which carry these transmissions are connected and
controlled by powerful computer switches capable of performing countless functions in addition
to their traditional telephonic roles. This makes the local telephone companies both an indis-
pensable link in many information services and formidable potential competitors in any such
market which they choose - or are permitted - to enter.
Danny E. Adams, Bell Telephone Company Information Services: Another Chapter Begins, COM-
PUTER LAW., Nov. 1990, at 25. It may also be the case, of course, that the RHCs will be slow to
enter the market for the provision of EDI services. Although they can now offer information serv-
ices immediately, recall that in the wake of the reversal of Computer III, competitive RHC busi-
nesses still must be provided via a separate subsidiary, subject to a variety of structural,
transactional, and accounting safeguards, as well as FCC implementation and waiver procedures.
Bell Companies, supra note 71, at 39.
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requirements and understandings that are established by convention,
multilateral initiative or bilateral agreement. These differing "levels" of
emerging telecommunications policies can have substantial implications
for international value added services, including EDI.
III. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS FOR EDI
A. Service Provisioning
A fundamental set of issues for EDI customers and service providers
in the international market concerns who may provide the EDI service
and under what terms and conditions. Specifically, may the service be
offered by a third-party provider or must it be offered by the PTT?. If it
can be offered by an independent EDI provider, must it be licensed, and
to what extent will it be regulated? Domestic telecommunications regu-
latory schemes in each of the originating and terminating countries on
the international network will largely dictate the answers to these ques-
tions. However, multilateral initiatives and international conventions
and agreements may also have considerable influence on the interpreta-
tion of ambiguous domestic provisions or the establishment of policies in
new and developing areas.
1 Domestic Regulatory Frameworks: A Comparison
As discussed above, in the United States, enhanced services are open
to competitive provision and generally are not regulated. Opportunities
for independent provisioning of EDI or other value added services are
often much different in other countries, and may alter significantly the
options for end-to-end configuration of international networks.
The following hypothetical illustrates the import of foreign domestic
telecommunications policy issues that arise in the international context
of EDI. Suppose that P, a third-party EDI provider, is located overseas
in Country 1. Company X, located in the United States, seeks to trans-
mit its EDI message to P abroad, who will then store and re-transmit the
message at a later date to Company Y, located overseas in Country 3.
While various efforts are underway to formulate EDI interchange or
trading partner agreements at the international level," such agreements
between private parties "do not and cannot alter the legal framework in
which they operate. Thus, to the extent legal barriers to the use of elec-
tronic communications technologies in commercial practice exist in laws
and regulations, those barriers remain."78
77 See generally Boss, supra note 1.
78 Id. at 1802.
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Such barriers to EDI transmission are potentially present in Coun-
try l's method of regulating the telecommunications technology upon
which EDI depends. Does a "basic"/"value added" service distinction
exist in Country 1?79 If so, are P's EDI services considered to be "value
added" services in Country 1? If P is deemed to offer "value added"
services, does the same consequence follow as in the United States, Le., is
the service regulated? Indeed, is the definition of "value-added" service
the same among the three countries? And what if one country's telecom-
munications regime is not yet substantially privatized or liberalized, such
that the government-sponsored monopoly provider of telecommunica-
tions service has reserved the provision of value-added services (includ-
ing EDI) to the monopoly, prohibiting the entry of P into the scenario
altogether?80
Thus, in considering EDI in the international context, the domestic
regime in the service provider's home country is only part of the picture.
For an international EDI transmission to occur, Company X must take
into account the network interconnection requirements at the other end
of the transmission. Unfortunately, such requirements will likely vary
with each country's regulatory structure, and the problem is exacerbated
by the rapid flux that currently characterizes world telecommunications
regulatory regimes.81
79 In Japan, for example, the 1984 Telecommunications Business Law created a much different
regulatory framework originally intended to avoid what were viewed as unworkable technologically-
based distinctions between "basic" and "enhanced" services. See Bruce, supra note 25, at 40. The
regulatory structure is based upon two different categories of service providers - "Type I" and
"Type Ir" carriers - based upon ownership of the underlying transmission facilities. Type I carri-
ers, the facilities-based providers, are closely scrutinized and regulated, including the degree of for-
eign company ownership. Type II carriers are essentially resale providers (Le., do not establish their
own circuit facilities), are not subject to restrictions on foreign ownership, and are subdivided further
into "special" and "general" categories. "Special" Type II providers include all international resale
service providers as well as certain large-scale domestic services designed for "many and unspecific
persons"; they must register with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and provide
notifications to the MPT of their service rates and terms. "General" Type II carriers are those that
do not qualify as "special," and in practice provide domestic service to specific users or to discrete
business groups within an industry. Takeo Miura & Robert J. Aamoth, International Telecommuni-
cations Services in Japan, in International Communications Practice Handbook, Federal Communi-
cations Bar Association International Practice Committee 261 (1991) (unpublished paper); see
Steven M. Spaeth, Telephone Systems in the United States and Japan: Differing Regulatory Regimes,
Differing Societies, 27 CAL. W.L. REv. 121, 125-26 (1990).
80 For example, Latin America is one of the latest global regions engaged in the rush towards
privatization and liberalized telecommunications. Until quite recently, however, many Latin Ameri-
can countries were controlled by military governments, and to the extent that value added services
were offered at all, they were exclusive offerings of the state-owned monopoly. See generally William
M. Berenson, Developing the Regulatory Footprint for Newly Privatized Telecommunications Provid-
ers in Latin America, 38 FED. BAR & NEws J. 400 (Sept. 1991).
81 As the NTIA has observed:
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Germany, for example, has a very different system from the United
States.12 In the German system, there are three categories of services: 1)
services reserved to the monopoly provider;83 2) certain mandatory serv-
ices, which must be offered by the monopoly provider but also may be
competitively provided;84 and 3) competitive services, which are not reg-
ulated. "Value-added" services, such as EDI, fall within the last cate-
gory. Thus, an international EDI provider could offer EDI services at
both the German and U.S. ends of the transmission, without regulatory
oversight.
The German regime reflects the attempt to avoid a distinction be-
tween "basic" and "value-added" services. There is no requirement that
competitive providers "add value," so long as the service offered is not a
"monopoly" service. Moreover, the monopoly provider, DBP Telekom,
is permitted to provide all forms of value added services in competition
[t]he interrelationship between the monopoly controlling a nation's basic telecommunications
transport network has become a major issue in all countries. Each country has attempted to
deal with this issue in different ways, with national regulatory structures permitting various
degrees of competitive service provision. The regulatory regimes in each country have evolved
separately, creating an array of sometimes parallel and often conflicting concepts and rules.
These regimes affect the provision of newly developed telecommunications services, as well as
the existing telecommunications network structure, which in most countries is owned by gov-
ernment monopolies.
IVANs, supra note 26, at I.
82 In Germany, the telecommunications operating entity is Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (DBP
Telekom), which is 100% government-owned and is under the regulatory authority of the Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications (MPTT). DPB Telekom has a legal and financial relationship to
the postal service operating entity (DPB Postdienst) and the banking services operating entity (DPB
Postbank). Each of the DPB operating entities has its own management and supervisory boards,
however, cross-subsidies between the operating entities are possible.
Until mid-1989, operations and regulatory responsibilities were vested in a single entity; pursu-
ant to recent regulatory reform, operations currently are conducted by DPB Telekom while regula-
tory functions are conducted by MPTT. Although MPTT and DPB Telekom are legally distinct
entities, complete separation of operations and regulatory authority has not occurred. MPTT is
responsible for appointing the supervisory board of DPB Telekom, setting DPB's long-term goals
and approving DPB's annual budget. Ronald Hopkinson and Karen Brinkmann Regulatory Models
Germany, unpublished presentation paper for "Latin American Telecommunications Reforms: A
Workshop on New Industry Structure and Regulatory Frameworks," presented jointly by the Or-
ganization of American States and Latham & Watkins (Apr. 1991); see Peter H. Ziemons, Telecom-
munications in the Federal Republic of Germany, U.S. Embassy Bonn, Economic Section Report
(November 1989).
83 Under new telecommunications reform, DBP Telekom will retain monopoly control over the
network transmission facility (except satellite and mobile), as well as monopoly control over basic
telegraph, telex, and voice transmission service over the public switched network (the storage of
voice and conversion of voice signals is not a monopoly service). Hopkinson & Brinkman, supra
note 82, at 3.
84 Mandatory services are undefined, but determined on a case-by-case basis to include services
with an overriding importance for development of the network infrastructure. Although such serv-
ices presumably can be competitively provided, the reason for the category is to provide the govern-
ment with a mechanism to offer essential services in case the competitive marketplace is not offering
them. See Ziemons, supra note 82, at 13.
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with private providers (although MPTT exercises some control over
cross-subsidization of competitive services by supervising internal cost
allocation).
The United Kingdom model is closer to the U.S. model in terms of
value added service definition and regulatory classification. Specifically,
the United Kingdom has adopted "basic"/"value added" functional def-
initions for services. 85 However, the definitions yield slightly different
regulatory consequences than in the United States. In the United King-
dom, value added services are "regulated" through the application of a
general, or "blanket," license. Any provider that offers a service that
conforms to the characteristics specified in, and meets the requirements
of, the license may offer the service.86 However value added service
providers remain regulated to the extent that they must register with the
U.K. regulatory authority, OFTEL (and may be required to comply with
informational reporting or other regulatory requirements).
The Japanese system is a further contrast to the U.S., German, and
U.K. value added service regulatory models. Like the German regime,
the Japanese system also eschews the basic/value added dichotomy. Ja-
pan instead has instituted a unique system that distinguishes between fa-
cilities-based (Type I) and non-facilities-based (i.e., resale) (Type II)
carriers. 87 Because value-added services essentially involve the resale of
underlying capacity, EDI and other value-added services generally fall
within the Type II category. The provision of Type II services, however,
is regulated, and requires the administrative approval of a comprehensive
service application. Thus, enhanced services in Japan can be indepen-
dently provided, but remain subject to regulatory scrutiny.
South Korea is an example of a country that until quite recently8
85 See supra note 26. The U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) defines "value added
service" as a "Relevant Service where, in respect of each Message conveyed by the Applicable Sys-
tem where there is provided a service additional to Basic Conveyance, together with any conveyance
of Messages which is necessarily ancillary or incidental to that service." IVANs, supra note 26, at
Attachment D (citing United Kingdom of Trade and Industry, "Class License For The Running Of
Telecommunications Systems Providing Value-Added And Data Services Granted By The Secretary
of State Under Section 7 Of The Telecommunication Act of 1984," 30 April 1987, Condition 4.8).
86 "The VADS Licence is what we call a 'Class Licence' which means that the generality of
service providers are automatically classed under it and need take no action to ensure that they are
licensed." UK Letter to Parker E. Borg, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 7, 1988), cited in IVANs, supra
note 26, at Attachment D.
87 See supra note 79.
88 South Korea passed a bill last summer to amend its telecommunications regime to create a
distinction between "basic" service providers and "value added" telecommunications service provid-
ers, and to permit foreigners limited access in both categories. See Doo-Sik Kim and Jan Kang,
Telecommunications Industry Liberalization in Korea, 13 EAST ASIAN EXEc. REP. 8 (Sept. 15,
1991). More recently, on February 17, 1992, the United States and Korea concluded the last of a
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had not liberalized its markets to permit competitive provision of value-
added (or any other) services. Therefore, in order to service customers in
South Korea, an international EDI provider would have had to intercon-
nect its network with, and hand off the South Korean portion of the
service to, the South Korean PTT.
Such examples illustrate the potential impact of differing domestic
regimes on the availability of international EDI services. An EDI net-
work connecting the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Ja-
pan and South Korea could encounter different regulatory classifications
in each country, along with different licensing and regulatory require-
ments and restrictions.8 9
2. International Regulations and Definitional Issues
a. International Classification of EDI
There are no internationally accepted definitions of "enhanced,"
"information" or "value added" services, and thus no consensus on how
EDI should be characterized with respect to any such international clas-
sification. Nonetheless, there is a general international acknowledgement
of a category of services offered by "International Value Added Net-
works" or "IVANs." IVANs generally are viewed as enhancing the util-
ity of basic communications through protocol conversions, conditioning
and maintenance, and packet switching techniques. 90 Thus, IVAN ser-
series agreements to improve access for U.S. firms to the Korean market for telecommunications
goods and services; South Korean concessions include liberalization of value added services domesti-
cally and internationally, streamlined registration requirements and elimination of investment re-
strictions by 1994, as well as improved access to the standards-setting process and the opening of its
government market including Korea Telecom. Henrik Hansen (with contributions from the law
firm of Lee and Li in Taipei), U.S., Korea Reach Telecom Agreement, 14 EAST ASIAN EXEC. REP. 6
(March 15, 1992). The agreement provides further illustration of how bilateral agreements can affect
substantially the provision of international value added services, including EDI. See generally infra
notes 176-186 and accompanying text.
89 Moreover, it is not clear whether an EDI service provider operating across another country's
national border will be treated differently within the recipient country than would a domestic na-
tional or a domestically established provider, Le., does the foreign country permit both local and
cross-border provision of service? This issue has been raised in both the Services Negotiations Uru-
guay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but is currently unresolved. See Patricia J. Paoletta, GAT Negotia-
tions, in International Communications Practice Handbook, Federal Communications Bar Associa-
tion International Practice Committee 143 (1991) (unpublished paper); George Kleinfeld,
Telecommunications Services & the NAFTA, in The North American Free Trade Agreement: Issues,
Options, Implications, American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, Inter-
national Trade Committee Publication 195 (1992) (unpublished paper).
90 IVANs, supra note 26, at 5. Examples of IVAN services often offered competitively through
private firms include EDI, protocol processing, database access, remote computer data processing,
electronic funds transfer, electronic mail, and voice messaging and retrieval. See id.
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vice may be said to embody one or more of the following features of
international service: 1) protocol processing91; 2) data base access (Le.,
electronic access to stored data); 3) remote computer data processing92 ;
and 4) value-added communications.93
IVAN service providers may offer a variety of services; the facilities
used to deliver the services are usually provided over circuits leased from
a public carrier (rather than owned by the service provider).94 IVAN
services are provided over both public and private networks; in some reg-
ulatory regimes, private networks can be interconnected with public
networks.9"
b. International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Recommendations
and Regulations
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was founded in
1865 as the "International Telegraph Union," and is the world's oldest
international, intergovernmental organization. 96 The ITU currently in-
cludes 164 countries (including the United States). Government repre-
sentatives of each of these States meet periodically at conferences to draw
up, by mutual agreement, regulations for the operation of telecommuni-
cation services, and recommendations concerning the standardization of
telecommunication equipment, operation and services.97
91 This term refers to changes in code, format, or protocol of transmitted information, which
allows computers on either end of the transmission to communicate with each other. See id. at 6.
92 This category includes performing mathematical steps, and data sorting, collating, storing,
erasing, or printing. Id.




96 See In the Matter of Draft International Telecommunications Regulations to be Considered by
the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference (WATTC-88), F.C.C. 88-55, May 24,
1988, at 2 [hereinafter Draft Regs]. The ITU, first established in 1865 with twenty members, became
"recognized" at the 1947 Atlantic City Conference as the United Nations' specialized agency respon-
sible for international telecommunications matters. Id. at 2 n.1 (citing International Telecommuni-
cation Union Convention (Nairobi, 1982)). The ITU has charged a number of subsidiary bodies
with carrying out particular aspects of the ITU's responsibilities. These subsidiaries include the
International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), and the International Telephone and Tele-
graph Consultative Committee (CCITT). Such committees develop technical and service regulations
and recommend standards applicable to their respective areas of responsibility. At the last Plenipo-
tentiary Conference in Nice, France (1989), the ITU established a new Telecommunications Devel-
opment Bureau (BDT) to focus on telecommunications development in developing countries.
97 Telecommunications Development Worldwide: the Telecommunications Bureau at Your Ser-
vice, ITU publication (1991) at 3. As defined in the Nice Constitution, the purposes of the ITU are
to promote the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds; to promote and
offer technical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommunications; to promote the
development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation; to promote the use of telecom-
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The actions of the ITU are of tremendous significance in assuring
the continued competitive provision and proliferation of IVAN services,
including international EDI. In this regard, there are three areas of ITU
authority of particular relevance. These are: 1) the International Tele-
communications Regulations adopted by the ITU World Administrative
Telegraph and Telephone Conferences (WATTC); 2) the bestowing of
"RPOA" status to service providers for many IVAN services; and 3) the
International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee
(CCITT) D Series Recommendations.98 The first two areas of authority
are addressed with respect to EDI service provisioning later in this sec-
tion. The D Series Recommendations are discussed in relation to inter-
national tariff principles in section B.3., below.
(1) WATTC-88 Efforts to Harmonize Regulatory Frameworks
How services are defined in ITU International Regulations also can
affect conditions for the provision of international EDI or other value
added services in individual countries. The International Telecommuni-
cations Regulations are promulgated pursuant to the International Tele-
communications Convention, and are binding on all signatories to the
Convention. The Regulations are periodically reviewed and revised at
World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conferences (WATTCs)
of the ITU.9 9 In 1988, in response to new telecommunications services
that had been and would continue to be introduced as a result of recent
technological innovations, WATTC-88 was convened in Melbourne,
Australia, "to consider proposals for a new regulatory framework to ca-
ter for [sic] the new situation in the field of new telecommunication
services."1 00
WATTC-88 is illustrative of both the perceived need to harmonize
munication services with the objective of facilitating peaceful relations; and to harmonize the actions
of member nations in attaining those ends. See id.; International Telecommunications Constitution,
Article 4, Nice (1989); IVANs, supra note 26, at 6 n.13; see also International Telecommunications
Convention, Article 4, Nairobi (1982).
98 See IVANs, supra note 26, at 6.
99 See IVANs, supra note 26, at 12.
100 IVANs, supra note 26, at 13 (citing International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi,
1982, Resolution 10). Resolution No. 10 of the 1982 Nairobi Conference had noted that the Tele-
graph Regulations and Telephone Regulations produced at the 1973 WATTC in Geneva, Switzer-
land, only dealt with international telephone and telegraph service. Resolution 10 stated that as a
result of the recent development of technology, new telecommunications services have been and will
continue to be introduced, and that it would be advisable "to establish, to the extent necessary, a
broad regulatory framework for all existing and foreseen new telecommunications service." It there-
fore resolved that a WATTC would be convened immediately after the CCITT Plenary Assembly in




international telecommunications regulatory regimes, and the formidable
difficulties that attend such a process. Before the conference was actually
held, there was a basic disagreement between liberal and conservative
administrations regarding the appropriate amount of international tele-
communications regulation. 1 ' The United States was among those na-
tions favoring maximum liberalization of telecommunications, and the
development of a competitive environment. 102 Other nations, while
favoring some degree of liberalization, felt that international telecommu-
nications should be subject to a number of universally applicable
regulations. 103
Because of these fundamentally conflicting positions, the final text of
the International Telecommunications Regulations is "a somewhat vague
and ambiguous compromise, and could be subject to varying interpreta-
tion." 04 The conservative or liberal interpretation of certain regulations
could form the justification for either restrictive or liberal domestic regu-
lation concerning the development of value added services in some
countries. 105
For example, differing viewpoints evidently were painfully apparent
in debates where many ITU members pressed to define the international
telecommunications services that can be offered to the public. 106 One
debate ultimately focused on the proposed language of Article 1.2, and
the definition of the term "public" used therein. Article 1.2 of the Regu-
lations reads: In these Regulations, "the public" is used in the sense of
the population, including governmental and legal bodies. °'TArticle 1.1.1
attempts to clarify certain terms mentioned in connection with the "pub-
lic" in Article 1.2: "The population" means people or individuals; "gov-
ernmental bodies" means an agency or department that contracts as a
customer for a telecommunications service; and "legal bodies" means en-
tities recognized in law such as a company, a corporation, a partnership,
101 IVANs, supra note 26, at 13. See Final Report of Preparatory Committee for WATTC,
CCITT Circular No. 67 (Nov. 9, 1987); Draft Regs, Notice of Inquiry, No. 88-55 (Feb. 9, 1988)
(summary published in 53 F.R. 5434, Feb. 24, 1988).
102 The United States statement concerning the draft international regulations stressed the need
for "flexibility," such that the regulations would account for differing national regimes; would not
mandate particular domestic consequences, or foreclose domestic choices of Member nations; and
which would account for "how technological change will affect the services generally available to the
public." U.S. Statement, CCITT Circular No. 67 (Nov. 9, 1987); Draft Regs, F.C.C. No. 88-55, at 7
n.18; see IVANs, supra note 26, at 13.
103 See Draft Regs, F.C.C. No. 88-55, at 7; IVANs, supra note 26, at 13.
104 IVANS, supra note 26, at 13.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Final Acts of WATTC-88, Melbourne, 1988, Article 1.2; see IVANs, supra note 26, at 13;
Proposed Regs, F.C.C. No. 88-55 at 18 20.
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etc., that contract for telecommunications service as customers. 10 8
"Thus, one interpretation of Article 1.2 is that the Regulations apply to
an all inclusive list of customers." 1"
This encompassing interpretation conflicts with that of the United
States, which, although favoring a regulatory framework for interna-
tional telecommunications services offered to the public by Administra-
tions"0 and other public correspondents, "does not favor defining the
term 'public' in a manner that can be interpreted to include operators of
private networks or closed user groups.""' Such an interpretation
would obviously expand the scope of regulation applicable to value-ad-
ded service providers, possibly including EDI providers." 2
A similar concern centers on Article 1.7a of the International Regu-
lations, which recognizes the right of any ITU member country, "subject
to national law and should it decide to do so, to require that administra-
tions (and RPOAs [see infra]) and private operating agencies, which op-
erate in its territory and provide an international telecommunications
service to the public, be authorized by that Member.""' 3 This provision
too is subject to varying degrees of interpretation. Some regimes could
attempt to apply this provision broadly in order to subject a greater
number of services to regulation." 4 The United States, however, con-
strues the phrase "telecommunication service to the public" to exclude
from its coverage non-telecommunication services, such as information
services, or those services provided by operators of private circuits or
non-public networks." 5 WATTC-88 did not specify precisely which
services are subject to the new regulations." 6
Because the scope of the international regulations remains vague,
ITU member nations can take alternatively liberal or conservative ap-
proaches to regulation of EDI and enhanced service providers, and still
108 IVANs, supra note 26, at 13-14.
109 Id. at 14.
110 Although the United States communications and information services markets include pri-
vate, for-profit common carriers and enhanced service providers, most of the world is still served by
government-owned communications entities referred to under the ITU Convention, regulations and
recommendations as "Administrations." International Communications Policies Governing
Designation of Recognized Operating Agencies, Grants of IRUs in International Facilities and As-
signment of Data Identification Codes, 104 F.C.C.2d 208, 214 n.18 (1986) [hereinafter RPOA
Order].
111 IVANS, supra note 26, at 14.
112 See id.






claim that they are endorsing the spirit of the regulations. 17 Thus, inter-
national definitional questions - e.g., whether the ITU definition of
"public" applies to closed- or intra-corporate EDI user groups, or
whether EDI services are included as telecommunications services -
will determine the degree to which EDI is regulated within and between
different countries' telecommunications regimes.
By the time the International Telecommunications Regulations
come up for another periodic review in 1994, regulatory regimes around
the world will undoubtedly be vastly different than they were in 1988.
Moreover, user requirements coinciding with the expansion of EDI and
other value-added networks should produce even greater pressures for
harmonization. Therefore, the regulations, which now lend themselves
to varying interpretations, could in the future actually provide a more
direct impact on classification of services for competitive provision. This
could substantially affect domestic accommodations regarding the provi-
sion of EDI.
(2) International Recognition of Value-Added Networks: RPOA Status
When networks require interconnection with a foreign PTT for the
provision of service, international regulations come into play. The perti-
nent regulations, issued by the ITU, concern the designation of "Recog-
nized Private Operating Agency" (RPOA) status to service providers for
the delivery of most telecommunications services." 8
RPOA status is a mechanism to facilitate operation of the ITU by
regularizing relations between those member nations who place responsi-
bility for communications matters in the hands of governmental entities
such as the PTTs and government-owned broadcasting services, and
those (such as the United States) who place their communications and
broadcasting services in the hands of private, non-governmental corpora-
tions. RPOA status gives such private entities an official status in the
ITU, which is primarily an organization of governments, and allows such
entities to contribute to the work of the ITU while reassuring the govern-
mental members that the private entities will abide by the international
regulations. The ITU, thus, uses the RPOA concept to facilitate interna-
tional cooperation in resolving communications issues and to avoid de-
structive interference.' 1 9
117 See id.
118 See id. at 7.
119 RPOA Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 627, 635 (1983) (Notice of Inquiry); see RPOA Order, 2 F.C.C.R.
7375, 7380 n.6 (1987) (Order on Reconsideration) ("The purpose of the RPOA concept is to assure
members of the ITU that private communications entities that are not themselves parties to the
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An RPOA is defined by the ITU Convention as:
[a]ny private operating agency which operates a public correspondence or
broadcasting service, and upon which the obligations provided for in Arti-
cle 44 of the Convention are imposed by the Member in whose territory the
head office of the agency is situated, or by the Member which has author-
ized this operating agency to establish and operate a telecommunications
service on its territory. 120
The ITU Convention defines "public correspondence" service as "[a]ny
telecommunication which the offices and stations must, by reason of their
being at the disposal of the public, accept for transmission." 121
The benefit of RPOA status is that it confers an imprimatur of offi-
cial recognition and approval on the subject entity, and reassures foreign
administrations with which the entity wishes to interconnect. 122 How-
ever, RPOAs must undertake to meet the obligations of Article 44 of the
Convention, which require submission to regulation. 123
In most ITU member countries, although not in the United States,
firms that provide international "public correspondence" services are
classified as RPOAs. 124 Thus, "firms which provide public international
telecommunications services, such as message telephone, real-time telex,
telegraph, and private leased circuit services are usually RPOAS."'125
The language of the ITU definition of "public correspondence" ap-
pears to suggest "some concept of service to the public."' 126  In the
United States, however, the FCC has emphasized that this term is not a
synonym for the U.S. notion of "common carriage" as the term is used in
the Communications Act. 127
Instead, the FCC has "interpreted the ITU definition of public cor-
respondence to refer to a 'transport service' (as distinguished from data
processing or data base access) of the type traditionally offered by admin-
istrations, in which the service provider conveys information unchanged
Convention will nonetheless be required to observe the rights of other member states under the
treaty.").
120 ITU Convention, Nairobi, at 149; IVANS, supra note 26, at 7-8. The grant of RPOA status
"confers upon an entity a class of membership in the ITU and its working subgroups which is second
only to that afforded governmental administrations"; "RPOAs are full participants in the work of
the ITU and can contribute their views in the development of new ITU standards." RPOA Order, 95
F.C.C.2d at 641 (Notice of Inquiry).
121 ITU Convention, Nairobi (1982), Annex 2 at 148; see IVANs, supra note 26, at 7; RPOA
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 215 n.21 (final order).
122 See RPOA Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 214 (Final Order).
123 Id. at 246. Article 44 of the Convention obligates the RPOA to obey the mandatory provi-
sions of the Convention and regulations duly promulgated thereunder.
124 IVANs, supra note 26, at 7.
125 Id.
126 RPOA Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 247 (Final Order); see IVANs, supra note 26, at 7.
127 See RPOA Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 215, 247 (Final Order).
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from sender to a non-related recipient." 128  Public correspondence in-
cludes both basic services and enhanced services, such as protocol
processing and packet switching, that act on the form but not the content
of the communication. In contrast, providers of enhanced services such
as remote-access data processing, which acts on the content of communi-
cations, are not deemed to engage in public correspondence.1 29  Such
service providers are not eligible for RPOA status. Thus, all U.S. provid-
ers of basic service, as well as providers of those enhanced services which
are considered by the U.S. to be "public correspondence," are eligible on
a voluntary basis to be RPOAs.13 0
On the basis of the above definitions, most IVAN service providers,
and most international EDI providers, which engage in some manipula-
tion or modification of the content of the messages transmitted, are not
eligible for RPOA status. This fact may narrow opportunities for inter-
connection. However, it also ensures that EDI providers are not directly
subject to ITU regulations, and it may help protect EDI providers from
being subject to foreign domestic regulations.1 31
It is apparent that EDI provisioning is affected by policies at all
policy levels, including national and international regulations and con-
ventional practices. The successful establishment of an international
EDI network therefore will depend upon the configuration of facilities
and services in a manner that properly complies with regulations in each
country and that fits within the established international framework.
B. Competitive Conditions
A second area of telecommunications policy that fundamentally af-
128 RPOA Order, 2 F.C.C.R. at 7380 n.5 (Order on Reconsideration).
129 RPOA Order, 2 F.C.C.R., at 7380 n.5 (Order on Reconsideration). The FCC has interpreted
"public correspondence" to be synonymous with the term "telecommunications," such that it de-
scribes "the kinds of communications that were offered by administrations at the time the definition
was added to the Convention - Le., those offered to third parties (the public)":
As such, we believe it is intended to distinguish such third-party or message services, where the
service provider transmits the sender's information without change in content, from the more
recent phenomenon of "data processing," where the provider uses a computer to manipulate
and alter the content of the customer's information ... service providers who offer pure data
processing do not offer public correspondence and, thus .... are not eligible for designation as
RPOAs. It is only those U.S. enhanced-service providers who offer a service which acts upon
the form but not the content of the customer's communication, which we in the United States
call enhanced but which other nations consider telecommunications, that would qualify for
designation as an RPOA.
RPOA Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 248 (Final Order) (footnotes omitted).
130 IVANs, supra note 26, at 7.
131 In the absence of RPOA status, or in cases where assurance of interconnection with the PTT
is critical, inter-governmental bilateral agreements sometimes provide alternate bases for intercon-
nection. See infra notes 176-180 and accompanying text.
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fects the provision of EDI services is focused on guaranteeing fair compe-
tition between EDI providers and basic services carriers. In the United
States and abroad, EDI and other value added service providers increas-
ingly must compete directly with the underlying carriers from which
they obtain transmission capacity. 132 In particular, the terms and condi-
tions upon which value added service providers and underlying carriers
can obtain transmission capacity substantially affect their relative com-
petitive posture with regard to the nature and price of services that can
be offered to customers. In many countries, telecommunications regula-
tors have begun to establish policies designed to curtail incentives and
reduce opportunities for underlying transmission services carriers to un-
fairly disadvantage competitors. 13 3 In addition, although domestic poli-
cies play a major role in ensuring fair competition, multilateral (or
regional) and international initiatives also exert strong influences.
There are two fundamental considerations attending the establish-
ment of fair competitive conditions for EDI and value added services
generally. The first consideration involves the terms that govern value
added service suppliers' access to the public switched network. 134 Such
terms include the prices and conditions of access to local exchange distri-
bution facilities, as well as prices and conditions for access to basic net-
work features and functions that permit efficient interconnection to the
network. The second consideration concerns prices for underlying trans-
mission capacity, and the conditions affecting "resale" of the underlying
capacity as part of the provision of value added services. An EDI or
other value added service supplier subject to discriminatory treatment in
these areas of access to network interconnection and resale of underlying
132 This process may be accelerated dramatically in the United States by the recent lifting of the
RHC "information services" restriction by Judge Greene. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
133 In the United States, for example, "[only a communications common carrier has both com-
puterization and its own transmission capacity at its disposal." Frieden, Computer Inquiries, supra
note 33, at 63. This "renders consumers, as well as new information processing firms, vulnerable to
the likelihood of more expansive communications common carrier marketplace abuses." Id. A pri-
mary danger is cross-subsidization. "The telephone company's ability to favor one service category
over others by accepting a lower rate of return on the favored category can transcend monopoly and
competitive market boundaries. The favored category can be a competitive market traditionally not
subject to public utility regulation." Id. Thus, both the FCC and MFJ court have attempted to
insure that carriers' zeal for entering new information processing/"value-added" service markets
does not allow them to abuse their ability to access their own transmission capacity. See id.
134 Not all value added services require interconnection with the public switched network, partic-
ularly if connection to the value added service supplier's mode is made by leased or dedicated line
obtained on a private basis and not pursuant to a public tariff. However such interconnection is
certainly required when value added service can be accessed through public network switched or
private line services. EDI services are generally available on either a dedicated line or "dial-up"
basis, using public network facilities.
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transmission capacity may be seriously disadvantaged in the market vis-
a-vis the value added operations of the basic services carrier.
1. Non-Discriminatory Network Interconnection: U.S. Competitive
Safeguards and Access Charges
As a basis for comparison, the United States has taken the lead in
attempting to ensure that value added services like EDI are competitively
provided, experimenting with both "structural" and "non-structural"
safeguards.
In the United States, basic services carriers with substantial market
power are perceived to have the incentive and ability to use their control
of "bottleneck" facilities to create barriers to entry and network access
for competitive value added services. It was this concern that motivated
the FCC in Computer II to impose the requirement of structural separa-
tion on dominant carriers' enhanced services activities. 35 Structural sep-
aration was not without its disadvantages, however, including
inefficiencies from duplication of facilities and personnel and stifled de-
velopment of network-based value added services.136
In Computer II, the FCC turned to non-structural safeguards
which included special rules for allocation of costs jointly incurred for
monopoly and competitive services, special rules on handling of CPNI,
and the ONA network access provisioning and pricing regime. 137 ONA
is intended to ensure that all enhanced services, whether they are pro-
vided competitively or by the monopoly carrier, can gain access to net-
work facilities and functions at the same prices and on the same terms
and conditions. 3
8
135 The Computer II structural separation requirements affected only the RHCs because of their
substantial market power. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. The MFJ also constitutes
a structural approach to the problem of prevention of abuse of market power. However, because this
discussion focuses on regulatory policies and approaches, we have omitted discussions of the imple-
mentation in the U.S. of antitrust remedies through the MFJ.
136 See Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 321 (the FCC subsequently "decided that the costs of
the separate subsidiary requirements in terms of lost innovation, inefficiency, customer inconven-
ience and delay outweighed the benefits in preventing cross-subsidization and discrimination"). For
a detailed treatment of the costs and benefits attending structural separation, see Computer III, supra
note 48, at 998-1012.
137 See supra note 48.
138 The FCC's Computer IlW decision authorized AT&T and the RHCs to provide value-added
services on an unseparated basis, provided that they complied with FCC-prescribed "non-structural"
safeguards aimed at "preventing preferential treatment of affiliates in terms of installation, mainte-
nance, quality of access, and disclosure of proprietary information about users' basic network con-
sumption"; the FCC also devised the ONA plan, that in essence called upon AT&T to unbundle
their network services into individual service elements and provisioning arrangements. Frieden, Eu-
rope, supra note 50, at 321. Computer III was reversed, rehabilitating the Computer II structural
separation regime. The FCC re-implemented ONA, however, in a subsequent proceeding. See supra
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Another feature of the U.S. regime for ensuring fair competition is a
system of access charges. This system provides compensation to local
telephone companies for utilization of local exchange facilities for the
origination and termination of long distance (including international)
calls. 139 The access charge system is intended to promote fair competi-
tion in .basic interexchange message services. The access charges are
designed mainly to recover the non-traffic sensitive (NTS) costs of "local
loop" facilities. 1" These NTS costs, which relate to the facilities re-
quired to connect individual subscribers to the network, are incurred re-
gardless of volume of calling or of the types of calls made. The NTS
costs are recovered through flat fees charged to end users as well as usage
sensitive charges paid to local exchange companies by interconnecting
long distance carriers. 4 '
After some debate,'42 the FCC has reaffirmed its position that value
added, or enhanced services such as EDI, should be exempt from the
usage-based access charges that must be paid by interexchange basic
services carriers. 143 The rationale is that enhanced services incorporate
basic transmission services, and that the required contribution to recov-
ery of local exchange costs is made by the carrier providing such under-
lying transmission services."4 The reach of the exemption obviously
note 52. ONA constitutes the FCC's "grand blueprint for reducing complex telecommunications
facilities to a menu of individual tariffed functions available for selection by users and enhanced
services providers." Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 321.
139 The FCC first adopted a comprehensive "access charge" plan for recovery by local exchange
carriers of the costs associated with origination and termination of interstate calls in 1983. See
MTS/WA TS Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983) (Memorandum Opinion and Order); see also
In the Matter of Petitions for Waiver of Various Sections of Part 69 of the Commission Rules, filed
by the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Pacific
Northwest Bell Telephone Co., the Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos., Pacific Bell, New England Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., and BellSouth Corp., 104 F.C.C.2d 1132, 1135-39 (1986) (providing
background).
140 Some traffic sensitive costs are also recovered by access charges. A detailed description of the
many facets of the access charge plan is beyond the scope of this article.
141 We refer here to the system of interstate access charges administered by the FCC. These
charges cover NTS local loop costs allocated to the interstate jurisdiction. NTS costs allocated to
intrastate jurisdiction are recovered under pricing plans administered by the applicable state regula-
tory authority.
142 See Amendment of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Provid-
ers, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 4305 (1987) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
143 See In the Matter of Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to En-
hanced Service Providers, 3 F.C.C. Red. 2631 (1988).
144 In addition, the FCC observed that the enhanced services industry is in the midst of a "vola-
tile" and "unique period of rapid and substantial change," citing both the implementation of ONA
and the MFJ's relaxation of information service restrictions on the BOCs. Id. at 2631-33. The FCC
decided that in light of such developments and their potential effects on the provision of enhanced
services to the public, "this is not an appropriate time to assess interstate access charges on providers
of enhanced services." Id. at 2633. In order to continue to provide "predictability and stability for
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depends upon the definition of enhanced services.
The access charge system has been pioneered in the United States.
Few other countries have yet instituted as open a market for basic long
distance services as the United States; hence, there are few countries that
have had occasion to develop a similar system.14 However, it is inevita-
ble that, as privatization and liberalization continue, long distance com-
petition will become more common. Other countries will then face the
question of how local loop costs should be recovered, and whether any or
all value added services providers will be required to contribute a share.
2. Multilateral or Regional Approaches: EC Initiatives
Other sources of telecommunications regulatory activity that can
greatly affect the international environment for EDI are various multilat-
eral or regional initiatives to reach consensus on international telecom-
munications issues.' 46 The efforts of the European Commission (EC),
the enhanced services industry during the transition to ONA," 4 F.C.C. Red. at 3987, the FCC has
continued to "retain the current enhanced service provider (ESP) exemption in its current form." In
the Matter of Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules relating to the Creation of Access
Charge Subelements for Open Network Architecture, 6 F.C.C. Red. 4524, 4537 (1991).
The Commission's commitment on this point appears to be wavering, however. In its July 1991
decision on ONA pricing, the FCC conditioned availability of ONA provisioning for enhanced serv-
ices providers on acceptance of usage sensitive access charges. See Amendments of Part 69 of the
Commission's Rules Relating to the Creation of Access Charge Subelements for Open Network
Architecture, 6 FCC Red 4524, 4535 (1991). Note that this is an issue of critical concern to Con-
gress, as it has a potentially significant and detrimental financial consequence for the enhanced serv-
ices industry. See House Telecom Subcommittee Hits FCC Decision in ONA Docket, COMM. DAILY,
May 1, 1992.
145 New Zealand last year privatized its state-owned telephone company and, in the process,
established policies promoting free market entry. However, New Zealand chose to forego establish-
ment of an administrative regulatory authority, and instead to rely upon competition law to govern
relations between companies. There is no system of access charges in place there. The U.K. also
recently opened domestic markets, both local and long distance, to competition. However, the U.K.
is attempting to encourage competition in local exchange markets and has not instituted a system of
access charges.
146 Although not mentioned in depth here, another significant regional effort with implications
for EDI is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperative (APEC) Working Group on Telecommunications.
APEC itself is an international forum seeking closer economic cooperation among countries on the
Pacific Rim, and is currently comprised of fifteen member countries, including the United States.
The organization is representative of a global incentive to identify and compile data on member
governments' telecommunications regulatory systems, and to work "together in supporting the de-
velopment of practical applications for the development of telecommunications" in order to achieve
broader goals of economic growth, trade stimulation, and mutual cooperation. APEC Telecommu-
nications Working Group, The State of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Regulatory Environ-
ment of APEC Economies, (November 1991) [hereinafter APEC Economies]. In keeping with such
objectives, APEC has established telecommunications as a high priority, and has initiated a long-
term project to study the practical application of EDI. See id. at 313-15, 334, 338, 344-46.
In addition, NAFTA is also an emerging regional agreement likely to have a substantial impact
on EDI. See supra note 89.
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which serves as the executive organ for the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), are a prime example of an ambitious and difficult multilat-
eral drive to remove regulatory and structural impediments to free trade
within the EEC in telecommunications markets, including EDI.147
In June, 1985, the EC published a White Paper entitled "Completing
the International Market,"14 which "was intended to serve as a mani-
festo for dismantling existing technical, fiscal, and legal barriers among
member states of the EEC."14 9 In June, 1987, the EC published its fa-
mous Green Paper,15 articulating the EC's "blueprint" for the EEC's
1992 telecommunications marketplace. 151
There are at least two EC actions following from the above that are
important in the context of competitive conditions for EDI. The first,
written pursuant to the White Paper, is the EC's July 26, 1988 decision to
147 Presently, there is no European telecommunications system; instead:
there are the often disparate networks of the member states of the EC. Not only are there
technical differences between the various jurisdictions of the PTTs [postal, telephone and tele-
graph administrations], but there is great diversity in the degree of competition allowed with the
PTT, in the extent and nature of access of competitors to the network, and in the extent to
which restrictive procurement policies are restricted. Great regulatory and structural impedi-
ments therefore exist to free trade in telecommunications markets, whether voice telephone,
computerized telecommunications or procurement of equipment.
John A.K. Huntley, Recent Developments in European Telecommunications Law, 7 COMPUTER L. &
PRAC. 49 (Nov.-Dec. 1990).
148 Commission of the European Communities, Completing the International Market (Com. No.
310) (June 1985) (Final White Paper).
149 Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 322. The White Paper contained approximately three hun-
dred proposals for legislation affecting a wide variety of economic activities, with a view toward
harmonization of laws of member states and mutual recognition of authorizations and licenses
granted by member states. Id. (footnotes omitted).
150 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green
Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment
(Com. No. 290) (June 30, 1987).
151 Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 322; see Reinhard Schulte-Braucks, Telecommunications
Law and Policy in the European Community, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 234 (1989-90) (discussing
Green Paper proposals and implementation of its principles with regard to the provision of telecom-
munications services and equipment throughout the EC). Along with the EEC Commission Report,
the Green Paper called for the deregulation of the terminal equipment market with procedures to
ensure unrestricted provision and interconnection of CPE; liberalization of value-added services;
separation of regulatory and operational responsibilities of telecommunications administrations;
tariffing on a cost-of-service basis; harmonization of standards to maintain or create network inter-
operability, while promoting innovation; deregulation of satellite receive-only antennas that do not
access the public switched telephone network; the requirement of open procurement of equipment by
postal, telegraph, and telephone administrations; the prohibition of cross-subsidies on carriers' serv-
ices subject to competition; and the creation of the European telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute (ETSI) to promulgate nondiscriminatory network operating standards, particularly for future
digital networks and ONP. Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 322-323; see Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, Towards a Competitive Community-Wide Telecommunications Market in 1992,
Implementing the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications
Services and Equipment (Com. No. 48) (Feb. 9, 1988).
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set up a competitive information services market.15 2 The stated purposes
of the Information Decision were to set up an internal information serv-
ices market by the end of 1992; to stimulate and reinforce the competitive
capability of European suppliers of information services; to promote the
use of advanced information services in the EC in a world market con-
text; and to reinforce joint efforts to achieve cohesive EC policies.15 3
The Information Decision is significant because its breadth "suggests
the potential for numerous policy directives based upon the information
generated under its various programs," e.g., on EDI and standardization
issues, that could have far reaching effects on EDI providers doing busi-
ness within the EEC.154 Unfortunately, the decision lacks adequate
working definitions of "information services" and "information services
market," a theme seemingly common to many regulatory attempts to
deal with such services; vigilance is therefore required since the EC's in-
formation policies addressing services like EDI may "overlap with issues
falling under other Community measures."155
Second, although 1992 will not see the complete harmonization of
telecommunications contemplated by the Green Paper, 156 one of the lat-
est significant steps towards this goal is embodied in the EC's ONP Direc-
tive."' The ONP Directive "contemplates open and efficient access to
public telecommunications networks and services within and between
member states," and establishes a number of "basic principles" which
apply to a number of telecommunications services.158 The EC's concept
152 See Council Decision Concerning the Establishment of a Plan of Action for Setting Up an Infor-
mation Services Market, OJ No L 288, 21. 10. 1988 at 39 (88/524/EEC) [hereinafter Information
Decision]; see Report of the Working Group on Telecommunications, Information Technology and
Broadcasting to the ABA Special Task Force on EC 1992 [hereinafter ABA EC Report].
153 Information Decision, OJ No L 288, 21. 10. 1988, at art. 1. To achieve these goals, the deci-
sion set forth a plan of action primarily establishing programs to gather information on the dynamics
of the market; investigate and devise methods for overcoming technical, administrative and legal
barriers; improve the "synergy" between the public and private information sectors; launch pilot or
demonstration projects to demonstrate "innovative applications of technology," promote the use of
European information services; and prepare a project to interconnect libraries in the European Com-
munity. ABA EC Report, supra note 152, at 6-9.
154 See ABA EC Report, supra note 152, at 6.
155 See id.
156 Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 323 ("Given the ambitiousness of the Green Paper and
subsequent documents, preliminary timetables will not be met, nor will the necessary degree of con-
sensus be achieved.") (citing Baur, Telecommunications and the Unified European Market, 24 TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS 33 (Jan. 1990)).
157 The Council of the European Communities, Common Position Adopted by the Council of Feb-
ruary 5, 1990 with a View To Adopting A Directive on the Establishment of the Internal market for
Telecommunications Services Through Implementation of Open Network Provision, Council Directive
No. 4078/90 [hereinafter ONP Directive].
158 Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 323 (footnotes omitted). These services include telephone,
data, leased lines, and digital networks. Id.
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of Open Network Provision (ONP) is much influenced by the FCC's con-
cept of ONA. 5 9 The key feature of ONP is the creation of a level play-
ing field for telecommunications competitors through standardization of
all network features."o
3. Pricing of Transmission Capacity: The Issue of International
Private Line Resale
Restrictions on international resale are other major potential imped-
iments to the development of IVAN and EDI services that may severely
constrain IVAN service providers' options for configuring and pricing
EDI services. For IVANs that have significant network traffic, aggrega-
tion of such traffic on high capacity international facilities (and subse-
quent "resale," with added value, of portions of the capacity to
individual customers) can involve significant economies. 161  However,
ITU international recommendations have historically frowned on this
practice and most country administrations have prohibited value added
service providers and other resellers from engaging in it.162 In contrast,
telephone administrations are not prevented from enjoying such
economies.
a. CCITT Recommendations
The CCITT (International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative
Committee) is a standing committee of the ITU. Its duties are "to study
and issue Recommendations on technical questions and tariff principles
relating to telecommunications services."1 63 As the principal interna-
tional telecommunications standards organization in the world, CCITT
issues Recommendations for such standards. These Recommendations
159 See supra note 52. The goals of ONA and ONP are quite similar, and both address "the need
to reconfigure the telecommunications infrastructure to achieve transparent and efficient access." As
one commentator has noted, however, ONP "has a much more fundamental and challenging man-
date" than ONA:
to harmonize network access terms, conditions, interfaces, and features within the twelve na-
tions of the EEC for all telecommunications services provided by incumbent carriers - usually
government postal, telegraph, and telephone administrations. This vision concentrates on har-
monizing a patchwork of regulations and standardizing infrastructures varying in degrees of
sophistication and accessibility. It also embodies an underlying procompetitive philosophy, but
does not expect incumbent carriers to relinquish their monopolies in essential, core services.
Frieden, Europe, supra note 50, at 320.
160 Huntley, supra note 147, at 51.
161 For example, an IVAN theoretically could lease an international T-1 circuit (1.544 Mbps of
capacity) and provide each of several different customers with a 64 kbps circuit. This would afford a
significant savings over the rates for individual international 64 kbps circuits.
162 The restrictions apply generally to resale, and are not limited to the provision of value added
circuits.
163 IVANs, supra note 26, at 8.
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are intended to provide the common bases for countries seeking interna-
tional telecommunications interconnectivity and interoperability. 64
Compliance with the Recommendations, as the designation implies, is
voluntary, although the Recommendations' substance is often adopted as
the basis for domestic public network policies by foreign
administrations. 165
The recommendations that most affect the provision of international
EDI and other IVAN services are the CCITT D Series Recommenda-
tions, focused on the use of private leased circuits. 66 The D Series Rec-
ommendations "deal with the general principles and conditions
applicable to the use of all international private leased circuits, including
those necessary for the provision of value-added services." 167
Until recently, under CCITT Recommendation D.1, an interna-
tional telecommunications private leased circuit consisted of "making
one or more international telecommunication circuits available to a cus-
tomer for his dedicated use on the terms and conditions which may be set
out in a lease agreement between the customer and the Administration of
the company at each terminal or circuit."1 68 Thus, a company in the
United States could:
obtain an international private leased circuit from a U.S. carrier and its
foreign correspondent (each providing one-half of the circuit) to transact
business according to the agreed-on terms and conditions of the lease agree-
ment for the private leased circuit connecting the firm's locations in the
United States to one or more company locations in the foreign country. 169
The circuit could be used for any voice, data, or other service desired by
the company and covered by the agreement.1 70
However, Recommendation D.1 also contained a restriction that
companies should not resell or share the private leased circuit with other
customers or individuals, Le., third parties, unless authorized by their
164 Id.
165 Id. (footnote omitted). "Because of the tendency on the part of some foreign administrations
to accept CCITT Recommendations as mandatory standards in their countries, the Recommenda-
tions usually serve as a point of departure in any international discussion of telecommunications
service with foreign administrations." Id. The United States has emphasized that it considers all
CCITT recommendations to be non-binding. See id. at 8; see also RPOA Order, 2 F.C.C.R. at 7380
n.6.
166 IVANs, supra note 26, at 8 (citing CCITT Blue Book Volume II-Fascicle II.1, General Tariff
Principles - Charging and Accounting in International Telecommunications Services, Series D
Recommendations, Geneva, 1989).
167 Id.
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administrations. 171 Since service to third parties is usually necessary for
the provision of IVAN and EDI services, this restriction greatly curtailed
the international development of such services.
172
The CCITT very recently approved a new version of Recommenda-
tion D.1 that dramatically departs from the former restrictive recom-
mendations on international private networks. 173 The new
Recommendation D. 1 calls upon countries to allow users to freely subdi-
vide international circuits into multiple channels and link them to other
private lines; encourages countries to let users resell network services via
international private lines, provided they do not infringe upon carrier
monopolies; encourages countries to let users interconnect one or both
ends of international private lines to public networks; urges countries to
require carriers to base international private-line tariffs on provisioning
costs, to charge users generally flat-rate tariffs, and to prohibit carriers
from levying tariffs that discriminate against groups of users or
vendors. 174
In short, the greatly revised Recommendation D. 1 lifts virtually all
explicit restrictions on the use of international private leased telecommu-
nications circuits, leaving any decisions on restrictions to national au-
thorities, which may, for example, require operating agreements on
competitive switched services. 1
75
Despite the change in the D Series Recommendations, individual
countries must still affirmatively modify existing restrictive policies based
upon the old D Series Recommendations. Thus, resale restrictions will
likely persist among many jurisdictions for some time. Nonetheless, the
revised D Series Recommendations represent a major step for the IVAN
171 Id. (citing Recommendation D.1 §§ 1.7, 1.8, pg. 10).
172 See id.
173 The revision of the D.1 Recommendation on "General Principles for the Lease of Interna-
tional Private Telecommunications Circuits and Networks" became effective as of mid-July, 1991.
See Toward Greater Competition in Telecommunications: Basic Services and Network Infrastructure,
International Chamber of Commerce, Position Paper No. 17, at 32 (adopted 3-4 Dec. 1991) [herein-
after Network Infrastructure].
174 See Barton Crockett, CCITT to Vote on Plan for Private Net Liberalization, Network World,
Apr. 1, 1991, at 24; see also CCITT Study Group III Clears Leased Line Liberalization Text for
Accelerated Approval, Telecommunications Reports (March 18, 1991); Barton Crockett, CCITT To
Advocate Global Net Freedom; Proposal Would Encourage Resale of International Private Lines and
Bring Pricing in Line With Service Costs, Network World, Dec. 31, 1990- Jan. 7, 1991, at 27; Mem-
bers of US. Delegation Say Draft Leased Line Guidelines OK'd by CCITT Study Group Met All U.S.
Objectives, Note Reservations Must Be Overcome Through Quick Implementation, Telecommunica-
tions Reports, Dec. 17, 1990 at 17-19; CCITT Study Group III Plenary Session Agrees on Draft
Revision of D. L Recommendation on Private Line Use, Charges; U.S. Official Says Changes Recognize
'Market Realities, Telecommunications Reports Nov. 26, 1990, at 20-21.
175 Network Infrastructure, supra note 173, at 32.
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services towards adoption of a liberal regulatory system for international
private networks. As global implementation of Recommendation D.1
progresses, evolution of VAN/EDI services offered internationally
should accelerate dramatically.
b. Bilateral Agreements
Bilateral arrangements between particular countries will also affect
international resale arrangements. Representatives of the U.S. govern-
ment have held bilateral discussions on resale and other international is-
sues with representatives of foreign telecommunications administrations
and other foreign government agencies since the mid-1980s. 176 These ne-
gotiations "were conducted with the expectation of greater liberalization
of regulations and policies in both foreign domestic and international
telecommunications and information."
177
In the course of such negotiations, the United States has entered
into several special arrangements with other countries that affect the pro-
vision of IVAN (and EDI) service.178 These bilateral "agreements" usu-
ally are neither formal conventions nor treaties. Instead, they consist of
correspondence between countries that convey and memorialize under-
standings that can have significant consequences in the telecommunica-
tions area. As such, they represent a flexible method of resolving
ambiguities in international or domestic telecommunications regulations.
An example of such a bilateral agreement affecting international re-
sale is the understanding recently reached between the United States and
the United Kingdom.
The arrangement, which concerns "Value-Added and Data Serv-
ices" (VADS), essentially permits the use of international leased circuits
in accordance with the national laws of both countries covering the do-
mestic use of private leased service. The present policies of both the
United States and the United Kingdom. favor permission of international
private line resale.' 7 9 In the words of the U.K. letter soliciting the agree-
176 IVANs, supra note 26, at 16.
177 Id.
178 Arrangements currently exist with the U.K., Japan, and Hong Kong.
179 See IVANs, supra note 26, at 17. The United States permits the unlimited resale and shared
use of domestic private leased circuits. The U.S. has also long promoted the elimination of restric-
tions on international private line resale. See, eg., In the Matter of International Accounting Rates,
7 F.C.C. Rcd 559, 560 (1991) ("The Commission remains convinced that the extension of unlimited
resale into the international telecommunications market would yield the same public benefits [as
unlimited domestic resale].") The U.K. Value-Added and Data Service (VADS) license permits
domestic resale of leased capacity within the United Kingdom for all telecommunications services
except simple resale, basic voice or basic telex, land mobile radio, and cable television. IVANS,
supra note 26, at 17. In 1991, OFTEL also released a decision following review of its so-called
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ment, "[s]uch an arrangement would have the effect of encouraging the
development and use of telecommunications dependent information tech-
nologies that utilize private leased circuits between the United Kingdom
and the United States," Le., technologies such as EDI.1 80
C. Responsibility for Underlying Data
One of the most important emerging issues arising from the specific
relationship between EDI and private network providers concerns liabil-
ity for any loss of or damage to the content of the material transmit-
ted. 81 In general, an EDI network provider is responsible for 1)
conveying the EDI message in a timely manner 2) unaltered and uncor-
rupted 3) to the receiver 4) without any leakage.1 82 Thus, the question
arises regarding the extent to which a provider is liable when, for exam-
ple, an interruption in the underlying telecommunications transmission
or a malfunction of value added features causes the loss, delay or destruc-
tion of transmitted data. The regulatory classification of both the pro-
vider and the service itself in international regimes, and the incidents of
regulation that apply, may have significant consequences in determining
an EDI provider's potential liability.
For example, in the United States, the notion of "common carriage"
has historically been relied upon to allocate risk between the carrier and
its customer for consequential damages flowing from transmission
problems. It is well-established that, absent gross negligence, the liability
of entities traditionally classified under the U.S. regime as "common car-
riers" for the loss of service suffered by a customer is reasonably limited
to credits for circuit rental for the duration of the outage or interrup-
"Duopoly Policy" indicating the intention to permit international private line resale on circuits to
countries with similarly liberal policies. See also, International Accounting Rates, 7 F.C.C. Rcd at
559-60 (observing that the British Embassy filed comments in the proceeding indicating the U.K.'s
hope that its "willingness to license international resale would lead other countries to adopt similar
policies"). It should be noted, however, that the U.K has not conceded that U.S. policies are suffi-
ciently liberal to warrant removal of private line resale restrictions between the two countries be-
cause of U.S. policies relating to the classification of foreign-owned carriers as "dominant." See
supra note 42.
180 Letter from R.J. Priddle to Parker E. Borg (Oct. 7, 1988), in IVANs, supra note 26, at Attach-
ment D.
181 See Jeffrey B. Ritter, Some Commercial Realities of Transborder Data Flow, Commercial
Attributes of Data Communication Networks, ABA Annual Meeting, at 3 (Aug. 12, 199 1) [hereinaf-
ter Ritter, Realities]; see also Russell P. Austin, Electronic Data Interchange: The International Envi-
ronment for Electronic Contracting, ABA Section of International Law and Practice Monograph
Series, at 8 n.10 (March 1991) (noting that the "liability of third party network operators is an
emerging issue of international concern") (citing TEDIS PROGRAMME 1988-1989 Activity Re-
port published by the Commission of the European Communities on July 25, 1990 (COM (90) 361 in
Annex E)).
182 Petre, supra note 22, at 11.
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tion. t1 3  Except in the case of gross negligence, a carrier normally may
not be held liable for the value of the information lost or for any other
consequential damages. Value-added/enhanced service providers, how-
ever, are not considered "common carriers" in the United States, and
therefore may be vulnerable to liability for damages resulting from de-
faults in the service unless service contracts provide for adequate
protection.1
8 4
The regulatory demarcation between common carriers on the one
hand and value added or enhanced service providers on the other, is sig-
nificant in this context. The demarcation indicates those activities (com-
mon carriage) for which doctrine and case law provide a safe harbor for
exclusion of liability." 5 The activities comprising the value added com-
ponent of the service must be specifically and expressly excluded from
liability by contract. The standard for determining behavior still subject
to liability (i.e., wilful misconduct, gross negligence or mere negligence)
also may be influenced by the common carrier doctrine.
Other countries may not have the common carrier doctrine, but
most of them recognize the impracticality of exposing basic services car-
riers to liability for damages beyond outage credits for loss or damage to
transmitted information. 186  Nonetheless, contractual requirements for
183 See Halpert & Co. v. New York Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C. Rcd. 2548, 2549 n.9 (1991)(citing cases).
Both the FCC and the courts have reviewed and found reasonable "tariff provisions which limit a
carrier's liability to its customers for service disruptions except in cases involving gross negligence or
willful misconduct." Id. (footnote omitted).
184 Limitation of liability for third-party EDI providers is normally treated as a contractual mat-
ter. See Chris Reed, EDI- Contractual and Liability Issues, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 36 (1989); see also
Ritter, Realities, supra note 181, at 3 (because of potential accountability of network service provid-
ers, "a customer's contractual responsibilities to its network for its data emerges from the passage of
current events as a feature of the service contract with new commercial significance"); Petre, supra
note 22, at 12 (noting that private network providers usually limit their liability contractually).
185 Exclusion of liability still must be expressly stated in tariffs or customer contracts.
186 For example, it is not unusual for public carriers operating under a state monopoly in many
countries to limit or exempt their liability by law. See Petre, supra note 22, at 12. In Belgium the
PTT incurs no liability whatsoever with respect to services provided, and similar complete exclu-
sions exist in Greece, Ireland and Denmark. Id. at n.14. In Germany and the Netherlands, the PTT
is held liable in specific circumstances, such as when damages are caused deliberately, and liability of
the public carrier is often limited to price paid for failed circuits, provided the circuit is out of order
for more than sixty minutes. Id. at n.15.
Such exemptions, however, are becoming increasingly difficult to justify as public carriers move
from basic offerings to enter the "value-added" services market; in 1988, an Italian Constitutional
Court ruled that a total exemption from liability was unconstitutional, and that service providers,
such as the PTT, should operate as an enterprise and thus be liable for negligence. Id. at 12 (citing
Judgement of March 17, 1988, Corte cost., 1988 Giurisprudenza Italiana I, No. 303, at col. 1443,
and Judgement of December 20, 1988, Corte cost., No. 1104).
Thus, in some cases, the liability of "value-added"/EDI service providers varies between re-
gimes depending upon whether the services utilized are offered by the PTT, and if so, the degree to
which the PTT is permitted to restrict its liability. The extent to which a monopoly carrier may do
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exclusion of liability could vary significantly from country to country,
depending upon how underlying transmission services are defined and
classified.
D. Technical Standards
Certain technical standards determine specifications for the uniform
electronic interchange of business data.187 Other standards guide certain
operating procedures. 188 Telecommunications standards and/or techni-
cal standards affect interconnection of EDI systems with transmissions
networks worldwide. Increasingly complex world transactions may well
require interconnection of EDI services and networks with a number of
different basic service networks.189
It is impossible here to examine technical standards issues with any
real particularity. However, telecommunication technical standards is-
sues undoubtedly will attain increasing importance as the expanding va-
riety of world networks accompanying privatization and liberalization
ultimately increases pressure to form clearly defined interface and end-to-
end performance standards. In this regard, the activities of telecommu-
nications standards organizations and such organizations' relationship to
telecommunications regulatory institutions should significantly affect the
provisioning of EDI services. 190 Thus, EDI providers and users should
carefully monitor the activities of individual domestic and foreign stan-
dards organizations. Bilateral agreements between countries can also sig-
nificantly influence technical standards.
this, in turn, may be dictated by the existence of provider categories, e.g., "common carrier," or by
the way a regime defines its "basic" network services.
187 Commercial Use, supra note 3, at 1703. Standards include provisions for the structure and
formation of data into "transaction sets" (which define the type of data which the specified transmis-
sion must contain and the format in which the data must appear), as well as the transmission of
formatted data. Id. at 1703 n.233.
188 Id. at 1703-04.
189 Interconnection raises increasingly complex issues. FCC Chairman Sikes, for one, has begun
to refer to the phenomenon of "networks of networks." Development of multimedia technologies
and customer demand for ever more flexibility and specialization of telecommunications offerings
will most likely lead to requirements for multiple and modifiable interfaces and alignments among
networks. See, e.g., 'Caretakers, Not Risk Takers" FCC Tells NCTA That Cable Has Edge Over
Telcos, COMM. DAILY, May 6, 1992.
190 In the United States, such organizations include Standards Committee TI Communications
(Committee TI), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and U.S. Study Groups or
Technical Advisory Groups for international bodies. See The NTIA Infrastructure Report. Telecom-
munications in the Age of Information, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration, 132-138 (1991). Foreign standards organizations include the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) (although note that each EC member
state has regulatory authority to set its own standards) and the Telecommunication Technology




For policymakers world-wide, the telecommunications regulatory
process has been rendered increasingly difficult by a broader phenome-
non of which EDI is but one manifestation. Communications and com-
puter technologies have converged, and have become the infrastructure
for a variety of financial and business services like EDI.191 Indeed, new
technologies have generated mounting pressure to add value to what we
in the United States would term "basic" transmissions. Regulatory re-
gimes have been forced to reassess rapidly eroding definitional distinc-
tions between services, and to cope with increasingly untenable divisions
among several interrelated industry sectors - telecommunications, data
processing, information, and other electronic services.192
This struggle has both short-term and long-term consequences for
EDI and other information services that have great potential to revolu-
tionize the conduct of domestic and international business transactions.
While the proliferation of information services has been a decisive ele-
ment in a global shift towards liberalization of telecommunications re-
gimes, it has not generated any uniform answers across these regimes as
to how much liberalization should occur, and as to how different services
should be defined or regulated.
In the near term, international telecommunications, with bur-
geoning privatization and liberalization will engender revision of regula-
tory structures at an accelerating pace. A great potential exists for
increased diversity of definitions and treatment of information services
like EDI - a diversity that could inhibit interconnectivity and hinder
global business transactions. Moreover, the problem is exacerbated by
the lack of a common model. No one nation's regulatory approach
stands out as ideally suited to address the potential advances in informa-
tion technology.
Nevertheless, EDI services provide an outstanding example of the
ultimate, long-term pressure that such developing technologies will con-
tinue to place on governments to harmonize their regulatory approaches.
EDI should continue to be emblematic of the manner in which the flow
of telecommunications and information-services across boundaries be-
191 See Bruce, supra note 25, at 4.
192 The convergence of communications technologies not only is increasingly evident, but is be-
coming a business in and of itself. See, e.g., Interaction Video and Data Services, F.C.C. 92-22
(released February 13, 1992) (granting radio frequency allocations for new interactive video data
service pioneered by TV Answer, Inc.) See also Joanne Kelley, "IBM's Foray into Cable TV Would
Speed New Multimedia Age," The Reuters Business Report, May 11, 1992 (reporting on a plan by
IBM to invest in cable television for provision of services based on integration of cable, computer
and communications technologies).
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comes more critical to national and international economies, fusing tele-
communications and trade policy. 193
EDI will continue to develop as a major force in facilitating interna-
tional business transactions, as countries continue to raise mutual aware-
ness of EDI's benefits. 194 This spread of transaction-oriented EDI
services that rely in large part on international telecommunications net-
works places pressure on countries to 1) develop a flexible set of interna-
tional tariff and regulatory principles and 2) ensure that
telecommunications regulation designed to address technical standards
and interconnect arrangements does not unnecessarily constrain the pro-
vision of new electronic financial, business or brokerage services. 195
It is true that, given the present layers of telecommunications regu-
lation, a snapshot of the world today reflects regulatory regimes in the
throes of drastic change. Nevertheless, international efforts mentioned
above - of world organizations like the ITU, of multilateral initiatives
like those of the European Commission, of bi-lateral agreements between
countries - suggest that the world is becoming increasingly committed
to dialogue and action that facilitate these goals.
193 See id. at 15.
194 For example, at the recent meeting of the Fourth APEC Working Group on Telecommunica-
tions in Jakarta, Indonesia, the EDI group identified two main objectives: 1) to implement an EDI
education and awareness program for all APEC members to assist them in reaching a high level of
understanding of EDI projects; and 2) to support and contribute to the development of an overall
strategy project specifically to expand the scope of EDI and attain total electronic information ex-
change related to trade throughout the APEC region. Apec Economies, supra note 146, at 344.
195 See Bruce, supra note 25, at 15.
